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Introduction

Wind turbines kill birds.1 A lot of birds.2 In the seemingly endless and
often contentious local planning board hearings, legal skirmishes and ad

* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Montana School of Law. Thanks to the
participants in the University of Montana faculty colloquium for their excellent
feedback, to Shannon Hathaway and Ross Keogh for their research assistance, and to
Lili, Sofia and Olivia for their support.
1. See Birds and Wind Development, AMERICAN BIRD CONSERVANCY (2012), http://www.
abcbirds.org/abcprograms/policy/collisions/wind_farms.html (noting that hundreds of
thousands of birds die each year in collisions with wind turbines). In addition to
mortality from collisions with wind turbines, birds are killed by collisions with
transmission lines associated with wind farms, as well as habitat disturbance from
activities associated with the construction and operation of wind farms. See also U.S. FISH
AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, DRAFT EAGLE CONSERVATION PLAN GUIDANCE 11-12 (Jan. 2011), available at
http://www.fws.gov/windenergy/docs/ECP_draft_guidance_2_10_final_clean_omb.pdf.
3
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hominem attacks that characterize the permitting process of a typical wind
energy farm, there is never serious disagreement on this point—wind
turbines kill birds. In fact, chances are that several birds will be killed by
what is sometimes jocularly referred to in the wind energy industry as “birdblade interfaces” in the time it takes you to read this article.3 What’s more,
wind turbine blades are equal opportunity consumers of birds. Like a small
child with a large allowance in a well-stocked candy store, turbines blades
will generally collect and consume whatever avian offering is within reach.
Of course, plenty of other things (both natural and man-made) kill
birds, too.4 In fact, if you’ll indulge me in a perhaps silly but nonetheless

2. The actual number of birds killed annually by wind turbines is a matter of
some debate, but is almost certainly in the hundreds of thousands. The U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service estimates that collisions with wind turbines may kill as many as
500,000 birds per year in the United States. See Wildlife Concerns Associated with Wind
Energy Development, U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE (2012), http://www.fws.gov/midwest/
wind/wildlifeconcerns.html. A recent report on bird mortalities from wind turbines
put the figure at 573,000 bird deaths per year, including 83,000 hunting birds such as
eagles, hawks and falcons. See Dina Cappiello, Wind Farms Get Pass on Eagle Deaths,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (May 14, 2013), available at http://bigstory.ap.org/article/ap-impactwind-farms-get-pass-eagle-deaths.
3. Eighty birds, to be (somewhat) precise. The math is as follows: There are
approximately 525,600 minutes in a non-leap year. Using the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service estimate of 500,000 birds killed by wind turbines per year in the U.S., that’s
an average of a little less than a bird killed per minute, but let’s make the math
easier by rounding up to one bird per minute. This article contains approximately
20,000 words. An average adult reader reads at 250 words per minute. See Mark
Thomas, What Is the Average Reading Speed and the Best Rate of Reading, HEALTHGUIDANCE
http://www.healthguidance.org/entry/13263/1/What-Is-the-Average-Reading-Speedandthe-Best-Rate-of-Reading.html. Assuming you are an adult reader of average speed,
it will take you approximately 80 minutes to read this article. That’s 80 birds killed by
wind turbines in the time it takes you to read this article, assuming you read the
footnotes like this one (though it will be slightly more if you’re reading this article at
night when bird mortality from wind turbines is higher).
4. See Meredith Blaydes Lilley & Jeremy Firestone, Wind Power, Wildlife, and the
Migratory Bird Treaty Act: A Way Forward, 38 ENVTL. L. 1167, 1171 (2008) (“[W]ind
turbines are not the only anthropogenic source of avian mortality . . . The leading
contributors to bird fatalities in the United States are: collisions with buildings,
power lines, and automobiles (with a combined total in the hundreds of millions,
possibly over a billion); domestic and feral cats (possibly over 100 million); pesticide
use (ranging from 67 million to 72 million); and communication tower collisions
(ranging from as low as 4.5 million to 50 million). Collisions with wind turbines and
airplanes fall at the lower end of the spectrum.”; see also WALLACE P. ERICKSON ET AL.,
NATIONAL WIND COORDINATING COMMITTEE, AVIAN COLLISIONS WITH WIND TURBINES: A
4
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illustrative tangent, imagine for a moment a dystopian vision of a future
world where the things have quite literally “gone to the birds.” In our future
world, which, with apologies to Charlie Parker, we’ll call Birdland,5 our avian
overlords have forcefully wrested control of society from humans. (If you are
having a hard time imagining how this might look, I refer you to the movie
trailer for Alfred Hitchcock’s 1963 horror film “The Birds.”6 Now those are
some angry birds!)
Now imagine that a bird has been killed in Birdland. The murder is
dutifully reported to the authorities and two bird detectives are assigned to
the case (if it helps, picture two sparrows in cheap suits with world weary
expressions). The first thing our bird detectives will do is put together a list
of suspects. At this very early stage of the investigation, with no information
other than that a bird has been killed, here’s what that list would probably
look like, in descending order of probability: building, power line, car, house
cat, tree, cell phone tower.7 You’ll note what is not on the list. Yes, wind
turbines. That’s because while wind turbines kill birds, they are far down
any list of the causes of bird mortality.
Alas, we don’t live in Birdland and humans are still firmly in control of
our governments and legal systems. Humans are also voracious consumers
of electricity.8 While an examination of the environmental price paid for the
generation of electricity from nonrenewable resources such as oil and gas
sufficient to meet the ever-increasing demands of humans both in America

SUMMARY OF EXISTING STUDIES AND COMPARISONS TO OTHER SOURCES OF AVIAN COLLISION
MORTALITY
IN
THE
UNITED
STATES
1
(2001),
available
at
http://www.nationalwind.org/assets/archive/Avian_
Collisions_with_Wind_Turbines_-_A_Summary_of_Existing_Studies_and_Compariso
ns_to_Other_Sources_of_Avian_Collision_Mortality_in_the_United_States__2001_.pdf.
5. Charlie “Bird” Parker (August 29, 1920 – March 12, 1955) was a leading
American jazz alto saxophonist and composer. Parker was the original headliner at
one New York City’s most famous jazz clubs, Birdland, which was named in his
honor. Since it opened in 1949, numerous jazz luminaries, including Count Basie
and John Coltrane, have recorded albums at Birdland. See History, BIRDLAND JAZZ CLUB,
http://www.birdlandjazz.com/history.
6. Movie trailer for THE BIRDS (Universal Studios 1963), available at
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R2Im8Lu5pP0.
7.

ERICKSON ET AL., supra note 4, at 1.

8. The world’s consumption of electricity increased from 16,391.506 billion
kilowatt-hours in the year 2006 to 18,466.458 billion kilowatt-hours in the year 2010.
See International Energy Statistics, World Electricity Consumption, U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION
ADMINISTRATION, http://www.eia.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/iedindex3.cfm?tid=2&pid=2&
aid=2&cid=ww,&syid=2006&eyid=2010&unit=BKWH.
5
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and elsewhere9 is beyond the scope of this article, it is inarguably a leading
driver of the relatively recent boom in the installation of facilities that
generate electricity using renewable resources, such as wind and the sun.10
Generating electricity by burning fossil fuels such as oil, gas and coal
causes the release of greenhouse gases (GHG) such as carbon dioxide,
methane and nitrous oxide into the atmosphere.11 According to the United
States Environmental Protection Agency, U.S. power plants that generate
electricity by burning fossil fuels create 67% of the country’s sulfur dioxide
emissions, 23% of the nitrogen oxide emissions, and 40% of man-made
carbon dioxide emissions.12 In addition to causing smog, acid rain, and
haze, these greenhouse gases are a primary cause of global warming through
the greenhouse effect. The greenhouse effect occurs when thermal radiation
from the Earth’s surface is absorbed by GHG and re-radiated back towards
the surface, elevating the average surface temperature above what it would
be in the absence of GHG.13 Further, environmental costs aside, fossil fuels
burned to generate electricity are a nonrenewable source of energy as the
world’s supplies of gas, coal and oil cannot be renewed or regenerated
quickly enough to keep pace with their use.14
Wind energy, on the other hand, is a low-emissions and inexhaustible
source of energy.15 Advocates for wind energy point out that, unlike fossil-

9. For example, China’s consumption of electricity increased from 2,525.046
billion kilowatt-hours in the year 2006 to 3,633.786 billion kilowatt-hours in the year
2010., International Energy Statistics, China Electricity Consumption, U.S. ENERGY
INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, http://www.eia.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/iedindex3.cfm?ti
d=2&pid=2&aid=2&cid=CH,&syid=2006&eyid=2010&unit=BKWH.
10. See Daniel M. Kammen, The Rise of Renewable Energy, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN,
(Aug. 21, 2006), available at http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=the-riseof-renewable-ene (noting that the rapid rise of renewable energy is chiefly
attributable to “the alarming trend of global warming); see also Renewable and Alternative
Energy Sources, SUNY LEVIN INSTITUTE, http://www.globalization101.org/renewable-andalternative-energy-sources/ (noting that the world’s consumption of renewable
energy has increased by almost 1,000% since 1980).
11. See Clean Energy, U.S. ENV’T PROTECTION AGENCY (2012), http://www.epa.gov/
cleanenergy/energy-and-you/affect/air-emissions.html.
12.

Id.

13.

Id.

14. Non-Renewable Energy, NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC ONLINE, http://education.
nationalgeographic.com/education/encyclopedia/non-renewable-energy/?ar_a=1.
15. See The Benefits of Wind Energy, NRG SYSTEMS (2008), http://www.nrgsystems.
com/AboutWind/BenefitsofWindEnergy.aspx (noting that as compared to fossil-fuel
generated energy, wind energy “won’t dirty the air that we breathe”); U.S. DEP’T OF
ENERGY, WIND ENERGY BENEFITS (Apr. 2011), available at http://www.windpowering
6
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fuel burning power plants, wind energy farms generate electricity without
releasing pollutants into the air.16 In fact, it’s estimated that replacing one
megawatt of power produced by burning a fossil-fuel with a megawatt
produced by harnessing the wind can displace 1,800 tons of carbon dioxide
in one year, which is the equivalent of the carbon dioxide displacement from
planting one square mile of forest.17 Additional benefits of wind energy
cited by its proponents include increased domestic security by reducing the
U.S.’s dependence on foreign oil and economic benefits to rural
communities where most wind farms are sited through lease and royalty
payments to landowners and the creation of construction jobs.18
Finally, to the extent anything as prosaic as the generation of
electricity can (or should) be described in such terms, wind energy is sexy.
Its appeal derives both from the muscular yet sleek silhouettes of the wind
turbines rising from the long grasses of a Midwestern plain like great steel
giants and from the “green relief” it offers by taking some of the edge off the
guilt many of us feel as we vegetate in front of our huge, electricity-sucking
flat screen televisions. Put another way, I’ve yet to hear anyone describe a
coal-fired generation facility as beautiful. Have you?
The potential for renewable energy to “solve” the global warming crisis
is a matter of some dispute. In their 2009 article in Scientific American
magazine, Mark Z. Jacobson and Mark A. Delucchi call for a “massive shift
away from fossil fuels to clean renewable energy sources” and set forth a
plan they contend would allow 100 percent of the world’s energy, for all
purposes, to be supplied by wind, water and solar resources by 2030.19
Energy from wind power makes up 51% of the renewable supply in Jacobson
and Delucchi’s plan, which if carried out would require the installation of
approximately 3.6 million additional wind turbines worldwide over the next
18 years.20 One can easily imagine the enormous impacts on birds such a

america.gov/pdfs/wpa/2011/wind_energy_benefits.pdf (“Electricity generated by wind
turbines does not pollute the water we drink or the air we breathe, so wind energy
means less smog, less acid rain, and fewer greenhouse gas emissions.”).
16. Benefits of Wind Energy, WINDUSTRY, http://www.windustry.org/news-andresources/policy-and-research/benefits-wind-energy.
17. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 15.
18. U.S. Energy Incentives, AMERICAN WIND ENERGY ASSOCIATION, http://awea.rd.net/
Resources/Content.aspx?ItemNumber=5039 (estimating that $1 million in economic
development is generated for every megawatt of wind energy produced).
19. Mark Z. Jacobson & Mark A. Delucchi, A Plan to Power 100 Percent of the Planet
with Renewables, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN (Oct. 26, 2009), available at http://www.scientific
american.com/article.cfm?id=a-path-to-sustainable-energy-by-2030.
20. Id. There were 199,064 wind turbines installed worldwide as of January 1,
2012. See How Many Wind Turbines are there in the World?, GLOBAL WIND DAY,
http://www.globalwindday.org/faq/how-many-wind-turbines-are-there-in-the-world.
7
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massive buildup of wind turbines would have. While there is no indication
that the political will or financial backing exists to carry out such an
ambitious plan, and the feasibility of doing so is disputed,21 it does highlight
the serious thought being given the role wind energy can and should play in
combatting climate change.
What is beyond dispute is the Obama administration’s rhetorical and,
increasingly, tangible support for increased renewable energy development
as a necessary bulwark against the growing environmental and economic
threats posed by our warming planet. In a speech on climate change and
the environment delivered at Georgetown University on June 25, 2013,
President Obama highlighted the important role the increased development
of renewable energy has in combatting climate change, calling for the
reduction of carbon pollution through the use of more clean energy.22 A key
component of the plan announced by the President was his direction to the
Department of the Interior to “green light enough private, renewable energy
capacity on public lands to power more than 6 million homes by 2020.”23
Erecting many more wind turbines on federal lands will undoubtedly
be a significant piece of any attempt to meet the President’s directive.24 And
The global installed capacity of wind turbines is expected to exceed 300 gigawatts,
the equivalent of 114 nuclear power plants, by the end of 2013. See Barbara Lewis,
World’s Wind Turbines to Cross the 300 Gigawatt Mark, REUTERS ONLINE, UK EDITION (June
14, 3013), http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/06/14/us-eu-wind-idUKBRE95D0WT20130614.
21. See James Hansen, Baby Lauren and the Kool-Aid, 5, available at http://www.
columbia.edu/~jeh1/mailings/2011/20110729_BabyLauren.pdf (“[S]uggesting that
renewables will let us phase rapidly off fossil fuels in the United States, China, India,
or the world as a whole is almost the equivalent of believing in the Easter Bunny and
Tooth Fairy.”).
22. Remarks by the President on Climate Change, WHITE HOUSE PRESS OFFICE (June 25,
2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/25/remarkspresident-climate-change. This was not the first time President Obama touted the
potential of wind energy to replace carbon-based energy sources in the U.S. During a
speech at a wind turbine manufacturing plant in Pennsylvania in 2011, the President
said that wind energy was the future of American Energy. Obama Touts Clean Energy in
Pennsylvania, UNITED PRESS INT’L (Apr. 6, 2011), available at http://www.upi.com/story/
photos/UPI-17811302078600. And in his State of the Union address on February 12,
2013, President Obama called on Congress to pass laws to “speed the transition to
more sustainable sources of energy.” President Barack Obama, President of the U.S.,
State of the Union Address (Feb. 12, 2013) (transcript available at http://www.
whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/12/remarks-president-state-union-address).
23.

Remarks by the President on Climate Change, supra note 22.

24. As of January, 2013, the U.S. Bureau of Land Management reported it was
considering 40 pending wind energy development applications on public lands it
manages with a total potential energy generation capacity of over 7,500 megawatts,
8
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these new wind turbines will certainly cause many thousands of additional
bird deaths, including increased mortality of a very special bird, the eagle.25
That special bird and the protections afforded it (and not afforded it) and
how the complicated regime of laws, regulations and guidelines creating
those protections can be squared with an environmental imperative to
generate more bird-killing renewable energy is the focus of this article.
Use of the word “special” is not meant to suggest that the life of an
eagle is inherently more valuable than that of a night-migrating songbird. In
fact, due in part to their much greater numbers, night-migrating songbirds
are killed in collisions with wind turbines at a much higher rate than are

which is more than 12 times the currently installed capacity of wind energy on public
lands. U.S. BUREAU OF LAND MGMT, BLM FACT SHEET, RENEWABLE ENERGY AND THE BLM:
WIND (Jan. 2013), available at http://www.blm.gov/pgdata/etc/medialib/blm/wo.
MINERALS__REALTY__AND_RESOURCE_PROTECTION_/energy/solar_and_wind.Par
.38552.File.dat/Wind_12_2012.pdf. Wind power is growing at a remarkable rate in the
U.S. In 2012, a record 13.1 gigawatts of new wind power capacity was installed in the
U.S., representing a 28% increase in cumulative installed U.S. wind power capacity.
These installations constituted 43% of all nameplate energy capacity additions in the
U.S. for the year, more than any other source of capacity. See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY,
2012 WIND TECHNOLOGIES REPORT iv (Aug. 2013), available at http://www2.eere.energy.
gov/wind/pdfs/2012_wind_technologies_market_report.pdf.
25. Unfortunately, because of their preference for nesting in high wind areas
and their hunting habits, eagles appear to be particularly unsuited to coexistence
with wind turbines. See Obama Administration doesn’t Prosecute Wind Farms for Eagle Deaths,
OREGON LIVE (May 18, 2013), available at http://blog.oregonlive.com/today/print.html?
entry=/2013/05/obama_administration_gives_win.html (“Flying eagles behave like
drivers texting on their cell phones—they don’t look up. As they scan for food, they
don’t notice the industrial turbine blades until it’s too late.”). See also Kristina Chew,
Wind Farms and Eagle Deaths: The Dilemmas of Green Energy, CARE2 MAKE A DIFFERENCE
(May 20, 2013), http://www.care2.com/causes/wind-farms-and-eagle-deaths-thedilemmas-of-green-energy.html (Quoting eagle expert Grainger Hunt: “There is
nothing in the evolution of eagles that would come near to describing a wind
turbine. There has never been an opportunity to adapt to that sort of threat.”).
Golden eagles appear to be at much higher risk of death by wind turbine than do
bald eagles, even accounting for their greater numbers. See Wildlife Concerns Associated
with Wind Energy Development, U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERV. (2012), http://www.fws.gov/
midwest/wind/wildlifeconcerns.html. A recent study by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service of 32 wind farms located in ten states (Iowa, Maryland, Wyoming, Oregon,
Texas, California, Utah, Washington, New Mexico, and Colorado) found that between
1997 and 2012 the wind farms were responsible for 85 eagle mortalities, 79 of which
were golden eagles. See U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv., Bald Eagle and Golden Eagle
Mortalities at Wind Energy Facilities in the Contiguous United States (2013), available at
http://www.bioone.org/doi/full/10.3356/JRR-12-00019.1#app1.
9
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eagles.26 But therein lies the point; it is the relatively few number of eagles
in the United States that has prompted the development of a regime of laws
specifically aimed at ensuring the survival of the species.27 As more wind
farms are constructed in areas of the country that eagles frequent, more
eagles are killed by wind turbines.28 For example, on average, 67 golden
eagles are killed every year at the Altamont Pass Wind Resource Area near
San Francisco, California, where one of the country’s highest densities of
nesting golden eagles share the ridgelines with 5,000 wind turbines.29 It
would require 167 pairs of nesting golden eagles to produce enough young
to compensate for this annual mortality rate in an area that has only 60
breeding pairs.30
This is occurring in California; a state that like several others has
imposed mandates on its regulated utilities to make energy produced from
renewable resources a bigger part of their portfolios going forward.31 And
it’s occurring in a country led by a President who has consistently stressed
the importance of developing America’s sources of renewable energy,32 while
touting advances made in installing new wind farms during his

26. See NATIONAL WIND COORDINATING COLLABORATIVE, WIND TURBINE INTERACTIONS
BIRDS, BATS, AND THEIR HABITATS: A SUMMARY OF RESEARCH RESULTS AND PRIORITY
QUESTIONS (Spring 2010), available at https://www1.eere.energy.gov/wind/pdfs/birds_
and_bats_fact_sheet.pdf (noting that roughly three quarters of bird casualties at U.S.
wind facilities are songbirds).
WITH

27.

See, e.g., Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 668-668d (2000).

28. See U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERV, supra note 25 (noting that large numbers of
golden eagles have been killed by wind turbines in the western states, as have a
much lesser number of bald eagles).
29. Louis Sahagun, Wind Power Turbines in Altamont Pass Threaten Protected Birds,
L.A. TIMES (June 6, 2011), available at http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jun/06/
local/la-me-adv-wind-eagles-20110606.
30.

Id.

31. Under California’s Renewable Portfolio Standard, all electricity retailers in
the state including publicly owned utilities, investor-owned utilities, electricity
service providers, and community choice aggregators must have 20% of retail energy
sales from renewable sources by the end of 2013, 25% by the end of 2016, and 33
percent by the end of 2020. S.B. X1, 2011-12 Leg. Sess. (Ca. 2011).
32. President Obama, in a speech made on March 12, 2012, said, “We can’t
have an energy strategy for the last century that traps us in the past. We need an
energy strategy for the future—an all-of-the-above strategy for the 21st century that
develops every source of American-made energy.” See Energy, Climate Change and Our
Environment, THE WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/energy.
10
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administration.33 And the federal government has done more than just talk.
A recent report estimates that the U.S. federal government will spend just
over $150 billion on clean energy initiatives over the 2009-2014 period,
which represents a more than 300% increase from the 2002-2008 period.34
This is on top of federal subsidies already provided to owners of wind farms,
such as the recently renewed Renewable Electricity Production Tax Credit
(PTC). The PTC is provides a 2.2¢ per-kilowatt-hour tax credit for electricity
generated by from wind energy.35
The tension is evident. For its part, the United States wants more wind
energy, but the United States also wants to ensure the survival of its eagles,
and it is inarguable that wind turbines kill eagles. For their part, wind
energy developers want to build more wind farms, particularly in
undeveloped high wind areas of the country that are also home to a lot of
eagles, but wind turbines kill eagles and the developers risk substantial civil
and criminal penalties for “taking” eagles under the Migratory Bird Treaty
Act36 and the Bald Golden Eagle Protection Act.37
A third group,
environmental organizations and bird advocacy groups, including the Sierra

33. See President Obama’s Approach to Energy Independence, ORGANIZING FOR ACTION
(2013), available at http://www.barackobama.com/energy-info/#!/wind (noting that
electricity generated from wind more than doubled in the U.S. during President
Obama’s first three years in office).
34. JESSE JENKINS ET AL., BEYOND BOOM AND BUST: PUTTING CLEAN TECH ON A PATH TO
SUBSIDY INDEPENDENCE 6, (Bookings Institute 2012), available at http://www.brookings.
edu/~/media/Research/Files/Papers/2012/4/18%20clean%20investments%20muro/041
8_clean_investments_final%20paper_PDF.PDF.
35. American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 § 407, Pub. L. No. 112-240 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 26. U.S.C.). Originally enacted in 1992, the PTC
has been renewed and expanded numerous times, most recently by the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (H.R. 1, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009)) in
February 2009 and the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (§ 407) in January 2013.
The United States is one of the global leaders in installed wind energy capacity, with
60 gigawatts of installed capacity as of the end of 2012. This represents
approximately 45,000 installed wind turbines, with capacity to power 14.7 million
American homes. See Heather Zichal, A Record Year for the Wind Industry, WHITE HOUSE
BLOG (Jan. 30, 2013, 5:08 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2013/01/30/recordyear-american-wind-industry.
36.

16 U.S.C. §§ 703–712 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).

37. A “take” of an eagle under the Act includes the unpermitted killing,
molesting or disturbing an eagle. Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. §
668c (2000). A violation of the Act can result in a fine of $5,000, imprisonment for
one year, or both, for a first offense. Penalties increase substantially for additional
offenses, and a second violation of the Act is a felony. 16 U.S.C. § 668 (2000).
11
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Club, National Audubon Society, and the American Bird Conservancy,
publically supports the development of wind energy, but recognizing that
wind turbines kill eagles, insist that it be accomplished with minimal
impacts on eagles in accordance with existing laws.38
This tension has had significant on-the-ground impacts for the
development of wind farms in the United States as wind developers and bird
interest groups engage in expensive and time-consuming battles at the
permitting stage of wind projects throughout the country.39 Seemingly
natural allies in their shared interest in reducing our country’s dependence
on carbon-based energy production (albeit perhaps motivated by different
incentives), wind developers and environmental and bird advocacy groups
nevertheless find themselves at odds in this debate, with each side insisting
it has the better legal, policy and economic arguments to support its
position. The result is an uncomfortable reality for all concerned, with many
environmentalists finding themselves in the awkward position of advocating
against one of the few sources of carbon-free energy production on our
rapidly warming planet and wind energy developers pitted against the
environmental organizations they typically depend on to support their
projects.
Perhaps this all could have been avoided if the federal laws offering
protections to eagles were flexible in their approach to balancing species
conservation with development, but little could be further from the truth. As
discussed in Part I, as conceived and drafted, these laws make little to no
allowance for the nuance required to accommodate the environmental good
represented by wind energy development within their species protection
frameworks. In an attempt to provide this nuance by giving some measure
of regulatory and financial certainty to wind farm developers and investors
and thereby encourage the development of wind energy, while also
confirming the primary eagle-protection goal of these laws in response to
concerns raised by bird advocacy groups regarding the large number of
eagles being killed by wind turbines, the government, through the U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service (the “Service”), passed the Eagle Permit Rule40 in 2009

38. See, e.g., Wind and Eagles, NATIONAL AUDUBON SOCIETY (2011), available at
http://policy.audubon.org/wind-and-eagles (stating that U.S. Fish and Wildlife must
address the “persistent problem” of unauthorized takes of eagles by wind farms).
39. See, e.g., the National Audubon Society’s comments on the Draft
Environmental Assessment to Permit Take as Provided Under the Bald and Golden
Eagle Protection Act for the West Butte Wind Project, Oregon (Feb. 17, 2012), available at
http://policy.audubon.org/sites/default/files/documents/20120217finalwestbuttewind
permitappdea-auduboncomments.pdf.
40.
12

50 C.F.R. §§ 22.26-.27 (2012).
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and issued the related Eagle Conservation Plan Guidance41 in 2013. Part II of
the article argues that these steps, while well-intentioned and helpful in
many respects, nevertheless fail to completely achieve either result and
require further, targeted revisions to increase wind energy investor and
developer security and spur more responsible development of wind energy.
Part III argues that the Endangered Species Act’s incidental take permit
regime, with its “No Surprises” assurances and life-of-project permit
duration, is the model the Service should follow in making these revisions.

II. Federal Laws Protecting Eagles
Befitting its status as the national bird of the United States,42 the bald
eagle is afforded legal protection from harm under several different federal
laws, as is its less celebrated species-mate, the golden eagle. Along with
many other species of birds, bald and golden eagles enjoy the protections of

41. U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERV., EAGLE CONSERVATION PLAN GUIDANCE: MODULE 1 –
LAND BASED WIND ENERGY, VERSION 2 (Apr. 2013), available at http://www.fws.gov/wind
energy/eagle_guidance.html [hereinafter EAGLE CONSERVATION PLAN GUIDANCE].
42. The bald eagle was named the national bird of the United States in an act
of the Continental Congress on June 20, 1782. The decision to make the bald eagle
the national bird of the United States was not without its critics. No lesser light than
Benjamin Franklin was no fan of the bald eagle and would have chosen a very
different bird; a view he forcefully expressed in a letter to his daughter in 1874:
[I] wish the Bald Eagle had not been chosen the Representative of
our Country. He is a Bird of bad moral Character. He does not get
his Living honestly. You may have seen him perched on some dead
Tree near the River, where, too lazy to fish for himself, he watches the
Labour of the Fishing Hawk; and when that diligent Bird has at length
taken a Fish, and is bearing it to his Nest for the Support of his Mate
and young Ones, the Bald Eagle pursues him and takes it from him . . .
Besides he is a rank Coward: The little King Bird not bigger than a
Sparrow attacks him boldly and drives him out of the District. He is
therefore by no means a proper Emblem for the brave and honest
Cincinnati of America who have driven all the King birds from our
Country . . . I am on this account not displeased that the Figure is not
known as a Bald Eagle, but looks more like a Turkey. For the Truth
the Turkey is in Comparison a much more respectable Bird, and
withal a true original Native of America . . . and would not hesitate to
attack a Grenadier of the British Guards who should presume to
invade his Farm Yard with a red Coat on.
Symbols – Turkey, GREATSEALS.COM, http://www.greatseal.com/symbols/turkey.html.
13
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the Migratory Bird Treaty Act.43 Unlike other species of birds, however, bald
and golden eagles are singled out for protection by two additional federal
laws: The Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act44 and the Lacey Act.45 Until
August 9, 2007 when it was delisted, the bald eagle was also protected as an
endangered species under the Endangered Species Act.46

A. Migratory Bird Treaty Act
Administered by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, the Migratory Bird
Treaty Act (MBTA) is the oldest federal law protecting birds. Enacted in 1918
to carry out the United States’ commitment to a 1916 convention between
the United States and Great Britain for the protection of birds migrating
between the U.S. and Canada, the MBTA was later amended to implement
similar U.S. treaties with Mexico (1936), Japan (1972), and the Soviet Union
(1976).47 The MBTA makes it unlawful at any time, and by any means or in
any manner, to take or kill, or attempt to take or kill, a migratory bird
protected under the Act.”48 More than 1,000 bird species are protected under
the MBTA.49 The term “take” under the MBTA means to “pursue, hunt, shoot,
wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or attempt to pursue, hunt, shoot,

43. See Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-712 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010);
and 50 C.F.R. § 10.13 (2012).
44.

16 U.S.C. §§ 668-668d.

45. 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371-3378 (2006). Passed in 1900, the Lacey Act makes it a
Federal offense to take, possess, transport, sell, import, or export bald eagle nests,
eggs and parts that are taken in violation of any state, tribal or U.S. law. Because its
relationship to the harms caused bald eagles by wind turbines is tenuous, the Act
will not be a focus of this article.
46. See Bald Eagle, U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERV. (July 2, 2013), http://www.fws.gov/
midwest/eagle.
47. See Digest of Federal Resource Laws of Interest to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service,
Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918, U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERV., available at http://www.fws.
gov/laws/lawsdigest/migtrea.html; see also Convention between the United States of
America and the United Mexican States for the Protection of Migratory Birds and
Game Mammals, U.S.-Mex., Feb. 7, 1936, 50 Stat. 1311, available at http://www.
fws.gov/le/pdf/MigBirdTreatyMexico.pdf; Convention Between the Government of the
United States of America and the Government of Japan for the Protection of
Migratory Birds and Birds in Danger of Extinction, and Their Environment, U.S.Japan, Mar. 4, 1972, 25 U.S.T. 3329; Convention Between the United States of America
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Concerning the Conservation of
Migratory Birds and Their Environment, U.S.-U.S.S.R., Nov. 19, 1976, 29 U.S.T. 4647.
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48.

16 U.S.C. § 703(a) (2006).

49.

50 C.F.R. § 10.13.
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wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect” a migratory bird protected under the
Act.50 The Act has no mens rea requirement, meaning, under the plain
language of the Act, violators can be prosecuted on a strict liability basis
without regard to the intent behind their actions that resulted in the taking
or killing of a protected migratory bird.51
Bald and golden eagles are among the protected migratory birds under
the MBTA,52 meaning, in theory, a wind farm operator whose wind turbines
take a bald or golden eagle is subject to penalties including imprisonment
and fines for each such take.53 Further, unlike the Endangered Species Act,
the MBTA does not provide a specific mechanism to permit “incidental” take
of a covered bird, so there is no safe harbor available for the nonpermitted,
unintentional take of a protected bird under the Act.54 Upon the appropriate
showing, the Service does have authority to issue take permits for certain
intentional activities that result in the death of a protected bird under the
MBTA, such as scientific collecting, educational purposes, taxidermy and
falconry.55 However, the construction and operation of wind turbines is not
an intentional act for which a take permit may be issued under the Act.
Now recall, as discussed above, that wind turbines are documented
killers of bald and golden eagles, along with many other species of migratory
birds protected by the MBTA, and the MBTA has been the law of land for the
entirety of the modern wind energy industry.56 Given that wind turbines kills

50.

Id. at § 10.12.

51.

16 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2) (2006).

52.

50 C.F.R. § 10.13.

53. 16 U.S.C. § 707. MBTA penalties include a maximum of two years
imprisonment and $250,000 fine for a felony conviction and six months
imprisonment or $5,000 fine for a misdemeanor conviction. Fines double if the
violator is an organization rather than an individual.
54. See, e.g., Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Pirie, 201 F. Supp. 2d 113 (D.D.C.
2002) (Department of Navy training exercise that resulted in the incidental,
unpermitted take of migratory birds violated the MBTA); United States v. Apollo
Energies, Inc., 611 F.3d 679, 684 (10th Cir. 2010) (incidental take resulting from
failure to bird-proof oil drilling equipment is a violation of the MBTA); United States
v. Moon Lake Elec. Ass’n, 45 F.Supp. 2d 1070 (D. Colo. 1999) (incidental take of
migratory bird from failure to install protective equipment on power poles is a
violation of the MBTA).
55. See U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERV., MANUAL, AUTHORITIES, OBJECTIVES, AND
RESPONSIBILITIES FOR MIGRATORY BIRD PERMITS 720 (Aug. 6, 2003), available at
http://www.fws.gov/policy/720fw1.html.
56. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service estimates that collisions with wind
turbines may kill as many as 500,000 birds per year in the United States, including
large numbers of golden eagles. See U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERV., supra note 25; see also
15
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protected birds, that such deaths while clearly not the intended result of
installing and operating wind turbines are indisputably an incidental result
of such operations, and that the plain language of the MBTA extends
liability to incidental killings of protected birds by corporate actors, one
would expect there is a robust body of case law involving prosecutions of
commercial wind turbine operators for violating the MBTA’s clear
prohibition against killing protected migratory birds.57 That expectation,
while reasonable, couldn’t be further from reality. To date, no wind energy
operator has been prosecuted under the MBTA for the death of a bird
covered by the MBTA.58
While there has lately been evidence of
prosecutorial stirrings, with reports that the Service is investigating eighteen
bird deaths at wind farms, with seven having been referred to the US
Department of Justice for possible prosecution, at the time of this writing no
prosecutions have been brought.59
There are many explanations for this perhaps puzzling lack of
enforcement, including: (i) its critics notwithstanding, the general public
popularity60 of, and governmental support61 for, wind energy as an alternative

Thomas Kunz et al., Assessing Impacts of Wind-Energy Development on Nocturnally Active
Birds and Bats: A Guidance Document, 71(8) J. WILDLIFE MGMT. 2449, 2450 (2007), available
at
http://www.nationalwind.org/assets/publications/Nocturnal_MM_Final-JWM.pdf
(citing studies of bird collisions reported from 31 studies wind energy facilities in the
United States showing that 78% of carcasses found at these facilities were songbirds
protected by the Migratory Bird Treaty Act.).
57. In this respect, of course, wind farm operators are not alone. Owners of
buildings, drivers of cars, and cat owners, to name but a few, are all potentially at risk
for prosecution under the MBTA for the deaths they (or, more precisely, the things
within their control) cause to millions of migratory birds each year. See Lilley &
Firestone, supra note 4, at 1171. (noting that the leading contributors to U.S. bird
fatalities are collisions with buildings, power lines, and automobiles, and predation
by domestic and feral cats).
58. Laurence Hurley, Obama Admin Sweats Legal Response as Turbines Kill Birds,
ENERGY & ENV’T. PUBL’G, (Jan. 26, 2012), http://www.eenews.net/public/Greenwire/
2012/01/26/1 (noting that no wind turbine operator has been prosecuted under the
MBTA for bird deaths caused by its wind turbines).
59.

Cappiello, supra note 2.

60. For example, in a poll of Iowa voters conducted by Public Opinion
Strategies in July 2012, 63% of respondents thought that America’s energy needs can
be met by renewable energy. Glen Bolger, Attitudes Toward Wind Power in Iowa, PUBLIC
OPINION STRATEGIES (July 30, 2012), http://images.politico.com/global/2012/07/120730_
iowa_statewide_memo.html.
61. In addition to financial support for wind energy through vehicles such as
the Production Tax Credit, as described in the Introduction, the Obama
16
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source of clean and renewable energy, and concern for the chilling effect
strict enforcement of the MBTA would have on the development of new wind
farms; (ii) the absence of a citizen suit provision in the MBTA, which
provides for criminal enforcement only by the United States,62 and does not
allow suits by citizens or private rights of action to sue a private party for
violating the Act (compare to the Endangered Species Act, which allows
such citizen suits);63 (iii) uncertainty about whether the MBTA’s prohibitions
against the taking and killing of migratory birds should extend beyond
activities that are explicitly intended to result in bird deaths (e.g., hunting of
migratory birds) to commercial activities, such as installing and operating
wind turbines, where the death of migratory birds is an unintended, albeit
perhaps foreseeable, result of the activity;64 and, perhaps most important,

administration has been an enthusiastic supporter of wind energy, including
providing $28 million in grants to aid the development of seven proposed offshore
wind projects. See Energy Department Announces New Investments in Pioneering U.S. Offshore
Wind Projects, U.S. DEP’T. OF ENERGY (Dec. 12, 2012), http://energy.gov/articles/energydepartment-announces-new-investments-pioneering-us-offshore-wind-projects. Indeed,
the federal government’s stated policy is for 20% of all U.S. electricity to be
generated by wind energy by 2030. See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, 20% WIND ENERGY BY
2030: INCREASING WIND ENERGY’S CONTRIBUTION TO U.S. ELECTRICITY SUPPLY (2008), available
at http://www1.eere.energy.gov/wind/pdfs/41869.pdf.
62. See Flint Hills Tallgrass Prairie Heritage Found. v. Scottish Power, No. 05–
1025–JTM, 2005 WL 427503, at *1-4 (10th Cir. Feb. 22, 2005) (finding that MBTA does
not allow a private cause of action by an environmental nongovernmental
organization against a wind farm developer for alleged MBTA violations).
63. There is a split among the U.S. federal courts on issue of whether the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) provides an avenue for a citizen to sue a federal
agency for violations of the MBTA,, with some courts allowing a private right of action
against a federal agency to enforce the MBTA through a civil injunction action under
the APA to enjoin the agency from granting necessary project permits unless the MBTA
is complied with, see e.g., Human Soc’y of the U.S. v. Glickman, 217 F.3d 882 (D.C. Cir.
2000), while others find no such authority under the APA for private rights of action
under the MBTA, see e.g., Defenders of Wildlife v. EPA, 882 F.2d 1294, 1302 (8th Cir. 1989).
64. Again, there is a split in authority on this question. In a recent decision
from the federal district court in North Dakota, the court rejected the federal
government’s attempt to hold seven oil companies liable for misdemeanor “takings”
under the MBTA for 27 bird deaths allegedly caused by the birds alighting on
defendants’ oil reserve pits. United States v. Brigham Oil & Gas L.P., 840 F. Supp. 2d
1202 (D.N.D. 2012). In dismissing the case, the court stated that the MBTA was never
intended to support prosecutions of “lawful commercial activity which may indirectly
cause the death of migratory birds.” Id. at 1213. See also Newton County Wildlife
Ass’n. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 113 F3d 110, 115 (8th Cir 1997) (court of appeals rejected
extension of MBTA incidental take provisions to logging activities that would
17
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(iv) the large degree of discretion afforded to U.S. Department of Justice is
deciding whether to prosecute incidental takings of birds by commercial
actors under the MBTA; a discretion that thus far federal prosecutors have
exercised in demurring from filing suit against wind farm operators despite
the clear evidence that wind turbines kill birds.65 Although this last rationale
is undercut somewhat by the government’s more active pursuit of
companies from other industries that kill MBTA-protected birds as an
incidental result of their operations. For example, in 2010, oil giant British
Petroleum was fined $100 million for violations of the MBTA stemming from
the Deep Water Horizon oil spill,66 Exxon-Mobil was fined over $600,000 for
violations of the MBTA resulting from the deaths of 85 protected birds at its
drilling and production facilities in Colorado, Wyoming, Oklahoma, Texas,
and Kansas between 2004 and 2009,67 and in 2009, PacifiCorp, a subsidiary of
MidAmerican Energy Holdings Co. and a wind energy developer in its own
right, pleaded guilty to 34 counts of taking protected birds in violation of the
MBTA and was fined over $10.5 million when its power lines and substations

inevitably resulting in the death of protected birds, holding that to do so would
“stretch this 1918 statute far beyond the bounds of reason to construe it as an
absolute criminal prohibition on conduct, such as timber harvesting, that indirectly
results in the death of migratory birds.”). But see United States v. Apollo Energies
Inc., 611 F3d 679 (10th Cir. 2010) (Tenth Circuit upheld misdemeanor criminal
convictions under the MBTA of two oil companies whose oil field equipment trapped
and killed migratory birds).
65. See John Arnold McKinsey, Regulating Avian Impacts Under the Migratory Bird
Treaty Act and Other Laws: The Wind Industry Collides with One of its Own, the Environmental
Protection Movement, 28 ENERGY L.J. 71, 78 (2007) (noting that “MBTA is mostly
accommodated in the United States by being ignored, or more euphemistically, by
“selective enforcement”); see also Letter from Newt Gingrich, Former Speaker of the
House of Representatives, to Lamar Smith, Chairman, House Committee on the
Judiciary (Feb. 22, 2012) available at http://heartland.org/sites/default/files/gingrich_
letter_re_wind_turbines_0.pdf (calling the government’s decision to bring charges in
the Brigham Oil case (see supra note 64) an abuse of discretion when the wind turbine
industry, which causes “vastly more accidental bird deaths on a regular basis,” has
never been prosecuted under the MBTA).
66. Guilty Plea Agreement, U.S. v. BP Exploration and Prod., Inc., E.D. La.
(Nov. 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/4332012111514361
3990027.pdf.
67. Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, Exxon-Mobil
Pleads Guilty to Killing Migratory Birds in Five States (Aug. 13, 2009), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/August/09-enrd-795.html.
18
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electrocuted 232 eagles.68 As many critics have pointed out, it is difficult to
identify a colorable legal rationale under the MBTA for the government’s
willingness to prosecute takings when they occur as an incidental result of
generating energy from nonrenewable resources such as oil and gas and its
refusal to do so when the taking is the incidental result of renewable energy
development.
While a full discussion of the long-running and contentious debate
over whether and how incidental takes of migratory birds by wind turbines
should be prosecuted under the MBTA is beyond the scope of this article,69
the existence of this still hovering “Sword of Damocles”70 hanging over the
wind energy industry provides important context for understanding the
Service’s decision to issue the Eagle Permit Rule and Eagle Conservation
Plan Guidance and the mixed reception they received from both wind energy
developers and bird advocacy groups.

B. Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act
Passed in 1940 and administered by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service,
the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act (BGEPA) provides protections for
bald and golden eagles to achieve and maintain stable or increasing
populations of the birds.71 As originally enacted in 1940, the Act was called
the Bald Eagle Protection Act, and provided protections to bald eagles only.
The act was amended in 1962 to extend its protections to golden eagles, at
which time it became known by its present name.72
The BGEPA prohibits the take, possession, sale, purchase, barter, offer
to sell, purchase or barter, transport, export or import, of any bald or golden
eagle, alive or dead, including any part, nest, or egg, unless allowed by
permit.73 A “take” is defined broadly to include pursuing, shooting, shooting

68. Press Release, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., Office of External Affairs, Utility
Giant to Pay Millions for Eagle Protection (July 10, 2009), available at http://www.fws.
gov/mountain-prairie/pressrel/09-47.html.
69. For a fuller discussion of this interesting debate, see e.g., Lilley & Firestone,
supra note 4; Scott W. Brunner, The Prosecutor’s Vulture: Inconsistent MBTA Prosecution, its
Clash with Wind Farms, and How to Fix it, 3 SEATTLE J. ENVTL. L. 1 (2012), available at
http://www.sjel.org/images/pdf/2013/brunner_prosecutors%20vulture.pdf; American
Bird Conservancy Rulemaking Petition to the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service (Dec. 14,
2011), available at http://www.abcbirds.org/abcprograms/policy/collisions/pdf/wind_
rulemaking_petition.pdf.
70.

See McKinsey, supra note 65, at 75.

71.

16 U.S.C. §§ 668-668d.

72.

Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 87-884, 76 Stat. 1246 (1962).

73.

16 U.S.C. § 668(a); 50 C.F.R. § 22.3 (2012).
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at, poisoning, wounding, killing, capturing, trapping, collecting, molesting or
disturbing a bald or golden eagle or their nests and eggs.74 “Disturb” is
defined as agitating or bothering a bald or golden eagle to a degree that
injures the bird, causes a decrease in productivity, or results in nest
abandonment.75 A criminal violation of the Act can result in one year
imprisonment and a $100,000 fine for an individual or $200,000 for an
organization.76 A second violation of the Act is a felony and can result in a
maximum of two years imprisonment and a $250,000 for an individual and
$500,000 for an organization.77 Maximum civil penalties are $5,000 for each
violation.78
While modeled after the MBTA, the BGEPA differs from that Act in that
it does not impose strict liability for taking a protected species.79 Rather, the
BGEPA applies only to those who act “knowingly, or with wanton disregard
for the consequences of [their] act.”80 To meet this mens rea requirement
under the BGEPA, the government must show that the defendant was
“conscious from his knowledge of surrounding circumstances and conditions
that his conduct will naturally and probably result in injury” to a protected
bird.81
Like the MBTA, permits for the intentional take of the protected
species are granted under the BGEPA. The Service may issue permits for the
intentional take of bald or golden eagles in certain circumstances, including
Indian religious purposes, falconry, and scientific and exhibition purposes,
provided that such permits are compatible with the preservation of the
species.82 The commercial generation of wind power is not a circumstance
that allows for the issuance of an intentional take permit under the Act.
However, unlike the MBTA, since mid-2009 the Service has authority under
the Eagle Permit Rule to issue incidental take permits under the BGEPA for
unavoidable incidental takes of eagles by commercial actors, including wind

74.

16 U.S.C. § 668c.

75.

50 C.F.R. § 22.3.

76. 16 U.S.C. § 668(a); 18 U.S.C. §§ 3571(b)–(c) (2000). Should explain that
each violation is $5,000 (or $10,000 for second offense), but that each take is a
separate violation. 18 USC § 3571 puts a cap on the total fine per offense, these are
the numbers the author is using.
77.

18 U.S.C. §§ 3571(b)–(c).

78.

16 U.S.C. § 668(b).

79. See U.S. v. Moon Lake Electric Ass’n, Inc., 45 F.Supp.2d 1070, 1074 (D.Colo.
1999) (“The BGEPA, in contrast to . . . the MBTA, is not a strict liability crime.”).
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80.

16 U.S.C. § 668(a).

81.

S.Rep. No. 92-1159, at 5 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4285, 4289.

82.

16 U.S.C. § 668(a); 50 C.F.R. § 22.26 (2012).
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energy developers, subject to compliance with appropriate avoidance,
minimization and mitigation measures.83

II. Incidental Eagle Take Permits
Whichever side of the eagle/wind energy line one falls on (assuming
there is such a line), there is no question that the development of a wind
energy facility in bald or golden eagle habitat is extremely likely to impact
the resident eagle population.84 In many cases, the “impact” will be the
injury, harassment, displacement and/or death of one or more eagles. In
other words, a “take” of an eagle that, absent preclearance, and
notwithstanding the fact that the take is incidental to the main purpose of
the development to generate electricity, but for the Eagle Permit Rule would
be a per se violation of the BGEPA, with all attendant civil and criminal
liabilities.

A. Eagle Permit Rule
In an attempt to balance to the BGEPA’s stated goal of limiting takes
of bald and golden eagles to achieve and maintain stable or increasing
populations with the on-the-ground realities of nonpurposeful eagle deaths
caused by otherwise desirable large-scale commercial facilities, such as
wind energy farms, on September 11, 2009, the Service published the Eagle
Permit Rule under the BGEPA.85 Similar to incidental take permits under
Section 10 of the Endangered Species Act, the Eagle Permit Rule authorizes
the Service to issue permits for the limited take of bald and golden eagles
when the take is associated with, but not the purpose of, an otherwise lawful
activity (Eagle ITP).86 The Service’s authority to issue an Eagle ITP is

83.

50 C.F.R. § 22.26.

84. The Service recognizes this issue: “[T]he development and planned
development of wind facilities (developments for the generation of electricity from
wind turbines) has increased dramatically in the range of the Golden Eagle in the
western United States. Golden Eagles are vulnerable to collisions with wind
turbines . . . and in some areas such collisions are a major source of mortality.” DRAFT
EAGLE CONSERVATION PLAN GUIDANCE, supra note 1, at 7.
85.

50 C.F.R. §§ 22.26-.27 (2012).

86. Id. § 22.26(a). The Service may also issue a permit for the intentional
removal or relocation of an active or inactive eagle nest where necessary to alleviate
a safety emergency or an inactive eagle nest where necessary to ensure public health
and safety, where the inactive nest is built on a human-engineered structure and
creates a functional hazard that renders the structure inoperable for its intended use,
or where the activity necessitating the nest removal, or the mitigation for the take,
will provide a clear and substantial benefit to eagles. Id. § 22.27.
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predicated on the Service finding that issuance of the Eagle ITP is
compatible with the BGEPA’s underlying goal of increasing or stabilizing
bald and golden eagle breeding populations.87
In making this
determination, the Service is guided by regional take thresholds for bald and
golden eagles established using the methodology contained in the National
Environmental Policy Act Final Environmental Assessment (FEA) developed
for the new permit rules.88 The FEA set regional take thresholds at greater
than zero for bald eagles in most of the Service’s regional management
areas, but set the threshold at zero for golden eagles in all regional
management areas, meaning any new authorized take of golden eagles
under the Eagle Permit Rule must be offset by the developer through
compensatory mitigation.89
The Service may issue an Eagle ITP where it determines the take is
compatible with the preservation of bald and golden eagles (i.e., complies
with the FEA’s applicable take threshold for the regional management area
at issue, either numerically or through appropriate compensatory
mitigation), is necessary to protect a local interest, is not the purpose of the
activity being undertaken by the permit applicant, and cannot practicably be
avoided (for a “standard” Eagle ITP) or is unavoidable even after
implementation of advanced conservation practices (for a “programmatic”
Eagle ITP).90 A programmatic take is a ‘‘take that is recurring, is not caused
solely by indirect effects, and that occurs over the long term or in a location
or locations that cannot be specifically identified.’’91 The Service may issue a
programmatic Eagle ITP for takes resulting in both disturbance and
mortalities based on implementation of ‘‘advanced conservation practices’’
developed in coordination with the Service.92

87.

Id. § 22.26(f)(1).

88. U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERV., FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT, PROPOSAL TO
PERMIT TAKE AS PROVIDED UNDER THE BALD AND GOLDEN EAGLE PROTECTION ACT (Apr. 2009),
available at http://www.fws.gov/migratorybirds/CurrentBirdIssues/Management/BaldEa
gle/FEA_EagleTakePermit_Final.pdf.
89. Id. This so-called no-net-loss standard means in return for being
permitted to incidentally take eagles despite the FEA’s zero take threshold the wind
developer must agree to implement compensatory mitigation measures that either
reduce another ongoing form of eagle mortality or cause an increase in carrying
capacity that grows the eagle population by an equal or greater amount than the
anticipated incidental take from the wind farm.
90.

50 C.F.R. § 22.26(a).

91.

Id. § 22.3.

92. Id.
Defining ‘‘advanced conservation practices’’ as ‘‘scientifically
supportable measures that are approved by the Service and represent the best
22
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A standard Eagle ITP, which authorizes individual takes of bald and
golden eagles where the take cannot practicably be avoided and occurs
during a limited timeframe is not well-suited to addressing potential
impacts to eagles from wind farms, which involve a continuous and lengthy
(often in excess of 30 year) operating period throughout which takes of
eagles can occur. But for one significant problem, a programmatic Eagle ITP
that authorizes takes that recur over the long term, are not caused solely by
indirect effects, authorize lethal take that is incidental to otherwise lawful
activity, and are unavoidable even after implementation of advanced
conservation practices would appear to be a better fit for mortalities caused
by collisions with rotating wind turbines.93 The problem lies in the Eagle
Permit Rule’s requirement that no Eagle ITP, including a programmatic
Eagle ITP, is valid beyond 5 years of its issuance date; a time period that is
at least 20 years less than the typical initial operating period for a wind
farm.94 At the end of this 5-year period, which is still less than 20% through
the normal project life of a wind farm, the wind farm operator must apply for
a new programmatic Eagle ITP, with no assurances that a new permit will be
issued or, if a new permit is issued, that it will not require the permittee to
implement advanced conservation practices that are far more burdensome
than those required by the original permit.95 Practically speaking, then, what
is the value to a wind project developer of securing a 5-year programmatic
Eagle ITP at the outset of a project with a 25-30 year operating life? The
answer is: not much.

available techniques to reduce eagle disturbance and ongoing mortalities to a level
where remaining take is unavoidable.’’
93. A fit expressly recognized by the Service: “[Programmatic] permits may
authorize lethal take that is incidental to an otherwise lawful activity, such as
mortalities caused by collisions with rotating wind turbines.” Eagle Permits;
Changes in the Regulations Governing Eagle Permitting, 77 Fed. Reg. 22,267
(proposed Apr. 13, 2012) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pts. 13, 22).
94. 50 C.F.R. § 22.26(h). This misalignment is demonstrated by the fact that in
the more than three years since the publication of the Eagle Permit Rule, the Service
has issued approximately 50 standard Eagle ITPs, but not a single programmatic
Eagle ITP, despite numerous wind farms being built during this period in eagle
habitat areas. See Eagle Permits; Revisions to Regulations Governing Take Necessary
To Protect Interests in Particular Localities. 77 Fed. Reg. 22278, 22279 (proposed Apr.
13, 2012) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 22). That may change in the near future,
however, as two proposed wind farms, the West Butte Wind Project in Oregon and
the New Era Wind Farm in Minnesota, have applied to the Service for programmatic
Eagle ITPs for expected eagles deaths from operation of the proposed projects. Both
applications have met with severe criticism from project opponents and, at the time
of writing, it is far from certain that either project will be successful in its application.
95.

50 C.F.R. § 22.26(h).
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B. Investor & Developer Insecurity
The initial capital outlay to build a utility-scale wind farm is enormous,
with each megawatt of installed nameplate capacity costing between $1.5
million to $2 million to install and make operational.96 The typical utilityscale wind farm has an installed nameplate capacity of at least 100
megawatts, with many exceeding 200 megawatts, requiring an initial capital
outlay of hundreds of millions of dollars to build. There are very few wind
farm developers that can (or for risk shifting reasons would want to) fund a
wind farm entirely from their balance sheets, so most must venture into the
credit markets to seek project financing from lenders. Project financing is a
project loan, with the debt backed only the wind farm’s assets (wind
turbines, transmission infrastructure, etc.) and the revenues generated by
those assets. The limited recourse nature of project financing, with the
lender limited to the wind farm’s owner and the farms assets and revenues if
the debt cannot be serviced, causes the prudent project lender to carefully
quantify and eliminate or minimize risk to the lender from the wind farm’s
failure before making the loan.
One critical area of potential project risk a project lender will focus on
is the adequacy and security of all permits held by the project. A potential
lender for a wind farm that is likely to result in the incidental take of bald or
golden eagles finds very little to reassure it in the current Eagle Permit Rule.
First, as discussed in more detail in Part III, because of the absence of a
clear mechanism for “No Surprises” assurances like those offered for
incidental take permittees under the ESA, and, second, because of the
inadequate five-year duration of any programmatic Eagle ITP the wind farm
developer might obtain for incidental takes of eagles—a lender wants to be
assured that the wind farm it invests in will be able to service the debt for
the life of the project, not merely for the first five years of operation.
When considering the potential impacts of undefined future
compliance and mitigation obligations on wind farms, the locked in nature
of a typical wind farm’s economic profile is a first order reality that any
potential investor must find comfort with.
Unlike other types of
developments with more flexible margins that allow the operator to pass on
additional, post-operation project costs to end users, a wind farm typically
sells the electricity generated pursuant to a fixed price power purchase
agreement (PPA) with minimum energy production thresholds signed prior
to operation of the wind farm. The inability to pass on additional costs due
to the fixed price PPA structure and the built-in penalties (often including
termination) in most wind PPAs for failure to meet energy production
thresholds are yet another reason potential wind farm investors pay close

96. How Much do Wind Turbines Cost?, WINDUSTRY, http://www.windustry.org/
resources/how-much-do-wind-turbines-cost.
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attention to undefined future liabilities that might impact the wind farm’s
viability in making their decision on whether and on what terms to invest.
Additional costs related to post-operational mitigation that erode the
project’s profit margin because they cannot be passed on to the end user
and, most significantly, the potential for termination of the project’s revenue
generator - payments under the project PPA, because of a failure to meet
production thresholds are two examples of plausible scenarios that would
give even the hardiest potential investor pause. Project investors behave in
a predictable manner when faced with future project cost uncertainty—they
shift risk to the project developer by charging a premium for the right to
borrow money, seek additional avenues of recourse (including personal or
corporate liability) if the project revenues become insufficient to service the
debt, or refuse to lend the money at all. In short, when the project risk
premium is heightened by uncertainty as to future project compliance and
mitigation costs, it is significantly harder for developers to obtain financing
to build the project at all or on terms that make it economically viable for
the developer to move forward with the project. The result is fewer wind
projects are built.

C. Proposed Rule Change
Recognizing the crippling effect this short Eagle ITP duration was
having on developers’ ability to obtain financing at all or on reasonable
terms, and also in response to intensive lobbying by wind energy
developers, in 2012 the Service proposed revisions to the Eagle Permit Rules
extending the maximum term for a programmatic Eagle ITP under 50 C.F.R. §
22.26 from 5 to 30 years to “facilitate the responsible development of
renewable energy and other projects designed to operate for many decades
while continuing to protect eagles consistent with statutory mandates.”97 In
a question and answer document it created about the proposed rule change,
the Service echoed the concerns with the five-year term for programmatic
Eagle ITPs expressed by wind developers, stating: “It has become evident
that the 5-year term limit imposed by the 2009 regulations . . . is not long
enough to enable many [renewable energy] project proponents to secure the
funding, lease agreements, and other necessary assurances to move forward
with their projects. To address this problem, the Service proposes to amend

97. Eagle Permits; Changes in the Regulations Governing Eagle Permitting, 77
Fed. Reg. at 22,267. This proposed extension does not alter the terms of standard
Eagle ITP under 50 C.F.R. § 22.26 or nest removal permits under 50 C.F.R. §§ 22.25
and 22.27, which will continue to have a maximum term of 5 years.
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the regulations to provide for terms of up to 30 years for programmatic
permits.”98
The Service’s recognition of the problem did not, however, translate
into a proposed rule that is likely to create the demand for programmatic
Eagle ITPs, and more important, the development of more wind energy
projects that the Service likely envisioned. The proposed rule takes a very
targeted and literal approach to solving the temporal problem with
programmatic Eagle ITPs: wind energy developers told the Service they were
not applying for the programmatic permits because their 5 year duration was
too short by at least twenty years to provide the cost and regulatory
certainty they need to obtain the land rights and financing necessary to
build a wind project, so the Service issued the proposed rule extending the
permit duration to up to 30 years. One might think this a laudable (and if
one were in a critical mood, rare) example of a federal agency identifying a
fundamental flaw in a program it administers and quickly (remember, the
Eagle Permit Rule was less than 3 years old at the time of the proposed rule
change) offering a workable solution. And that would be true but for the
proposed rule’s explicit retention of the Eagle Permit Rule’s condition to the
issuance of a programmatic Eagle ITP that allows the Service to “amend,
suspend, or revoke a programmatic permit . . . if new information indicates
that revised permit conditions are necessary, or that suspension or
revocation is necessary, to safeguard local or regional eagle populations.”99
The proposed rule’s discussion of the mitigation and conservation
measures the Service will require of the holder of a 30-year programmatic
Eagle ITP begins with the rational proposition that the longer permit
duration requires a commensurate commitment from the permit applicant
in the permit’s terms and conditions to “implement additional specified
mitigation measures” should the level of take anticipated in the permit be
exceeded or if new scientific information shows that such measures are
necessary to preserve eagles.100 These additional mitigation measures would
be a back-stop of sorts to be implemented during the life of the project
should the advanced conservation practices to avoid and minimize eagle
take that a permittee is required to agree to and implement to obtain a
programmatic Eagle ITP not achieve their intended result.101 Continuing the

98. U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERV., CHANGES IN THE REGULATIONS GOVERNING EAGLE
PERMITTING QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS (2012), available at http://www.fws.gov/migratory
birds/PDFs/Eagle%20Tenure%20Rule%20QandA%204.12.12.pdf.
99.

50 C.F.R. § 22.26(c)(7).

100. Eagle Permits; Changes in the Regulations Governing Eagle Permitting,
77 Fed. Reg. at 22,268.
101. Id. The proposed rule states that these additional measures might
include “additional compensatory mitigation to mitigate the level of authorized take, or, if
necessary for the preservation of eagles, below the originally authorized take levels.”
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theme of reducing the permittee’s cost uncertainty, the Service suggests that
these additional mitigation measures should be identified and described
“up-front” in the permit itself.102 While one can easily imagine the Service
and the permit applicant struggling to reach agreement on the triggers for
and nature of these additional mitigation measures, the fact that they would
be set in the application process does give the applicant and its investors
the ability to factor their possible occurrence into the project’s risk-benefit
profile before they have committed significant resources into the project.
If the proposed rule stopped there, it would represent a significant
step forward in providing wind developers the cost certainty required to
secure the funding necessary to build wind farms. But it doesn’t stop there.
Instead, in two short sentences, the proposed rule undoes the seeming
promise of cost certainty and obviates the Service’s expressed intent in
proposing the rule to “enable [wind developers] to secure the funding, lease
agreements, and other necessary assurances to move forward with their
projects.”103 Immediately after its discussion of the importance of providing
the applicant with cost certainty by specifying additional mitigation
measures up-front, the Service states:
“However, if such conditions prove inadequate to meet the Eagle
Act’s preservation standard, the regulations at § 22.26(c)(7) allow
the Service to further amend programmatic permits if necessary
to safeguard eagle populations. The last option would be permit
revocation if the activity is not compatible with the preservation
of the eagle.”104
The Eagle Act’s preservation standard has been interpreted by the
Service to mean that any take of eagles it authorizes is “consistent with the
goal of stable or increasing breeding populations.”105 By applying this
preservation standard in its on-going assessment of the efficacy of a
programmatic permittee’s mitigation measures, the Service essentially
reserves the unfettered right to reduce a permittee’s permitted incidental
take all the way down to zero. This would very likely require the partial or
complete suspension of operations for an unknown period of time, which
acts to reintroduce the very permit and cost uncertainties the proposed rule
change was intended to address.
The proposed rule change met with a mixed reception that broke along
predictable lines. For their part, wind advocacy groups used the proposed

102.

Id.

103.

U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERV., supra note 98.

104. Eagle Permits; Changes in the Regulations Governing Eagle Permitting,
77 Fed. Reg. at 22,268.
105.

EAGLE CONSERVATION PLAN GUIDANCE, supra note 41, at 4.
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rule’s notice and comment period to submit comments endorsing the
proposed permit term extension and the salutary effect it could have on
attracting investment in renewable energy projects. At the same time, the
groups asserted that the regulatory uncertainty created by the proposed
rule’s reservation of rights for the Service to impose additional mitigation
measures on the permittee at any time during the life of the thirty-year
permit, decrease the level of authorized take, and even revoke the permit
entirely effectively destroyed this benefit.106 Conversely, several bird
advocacy groups joined together to submit a comment letter arguing that
the proposed 25-year extension of the duration of a programmatic Eagle ITP
was inconsistent with the Service’s legal obligation under the BGEPA to
ensure preservation of eagles, that the rulemaking itself, absent additional
environmental review and analysis, violated NEPA and the Administrative
Procedure Act, and was further proof of the Service’s “disjointed and
confusing” approach to issuing eagle take permits under the BGEPA.107
This last point is a direct reference to the curious timing of the
proposed rule-making, coming as it did more than a year after the Service
issued its Draft Eagle Conservation Plan Guidance (the “Draft Eagle
Guidance”)108 aimed at providing guidance on the issuance of programmatic
eagle permits, less than a month after the Service issued its final LandBased Wind Energy Guidelines,109 and on the same day the Service issued an

106. For example, in its public comment submitted to the Service, the
American Wind Energy Association, the leading wind energy trade association,
lauded the Service’s “increasing recognition that of the reality that, in order to secure
financing for many capital-intensive, long-term projects, such as wind energy
facilities, there must be a high level of certainty that regulatory approvals will remain
in effect over a facility’s serviceable life and not allow for unanticipated mitigation
costs to be applied at a later date (e.g., upon renewal of a five-year permit),” but
expressed concern that the proposed rule “still fails to provide sufficient certainty
with respect to future mitigation costs, thereby perpetuating an imbalanced riskbenefit profile to all parties involved in wind energy development.” See American
Wind Energy Association Comments on Changes in the Regulations Governing Eagle
Permitting to U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv. (July 12, 2012), available at http://www.
regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FWS-R9-MB-2011-0054-0138.
107. See Defenders of Wildlife, National Audubon Society, Natural Resources
Defense Council, The Wilderness Society, Sierra Club, and 89 Audubon Society state
offices’ Joint Comment Letter on Changes in the Regulations Governing Eagle
Permitting to U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv., available at http://wilderness.org/sites/
default/files/jointcommentsDoWAudNRDCetalFWSeagleNOPR7122012_2.pdf.
108.

DRAFT EAGLE CONSERVATION PLAN GUIDANCE, supra note 1.

109. U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERV., LAND-BASED WIND ENERGY GUIDELINES (Mar. 23,
2012), available at http://www.fws.gov/windenergy/docs/WEG_final.pdf. Similar to the
Final Eagle Guidance, the Land-Based Wind Energy Guidelines offer guidance to
28

West

Northwest, Vol. 20, No. 1, Winter 2014

advance notice of a separate proposed rulemaking aimed at soliciting public
comments about how the Service can clarify the criteria for issuance of
programmatic Eagle ITPs under the Eagle Permit Rule.110 Indeed it’s not
difficult to muster sympathy for the plight of both wind project developers
and bird advocacy groups as they try to work their way through this
extremely messy and at times contradictory mélange of rules, proposed
rules, guidance and laws related to wind energy and eagles. Add to that the
fact that many of the ingredients in this regulatory soup are not yet fully
cooked and the chances for the recipe resulting in a satisfying result for
anyone are slim.

D. Eagle Conservation Plan Guidance
The Service received over 130 public comments during the public
comment period for the Draft Eagle Guidance, including voluminous
comments from several wind developers, state agencies, wind energy trade
groups, bird interest groups, and unaffiliated individuals.111
These
comments show that, as was the case with the Eagle Permit Rule and the
proposed rule to extend the programmatic Eagle ITP term to 30 years, this
attempt to balance many competing interests within an existing legal

wind project developers on voluntary steps they can take to address risks to species
of concern from wind energy development. The Land-Based Guidelines specify that the
“compatible” Eagle Plan Guidance, not the Land-based Guidelines, is to be consulted
by a developer if eagles are identified as a potential risk at a project site. Id. at 3.
110. Eagle Permits; Revisions to Regulations Governing Take Necessary To
Protect Interests in Particular Localities. 77 Fed. Reg. 22278 (proposed Apr. 13, 2012)
(to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 22) (noting that stakeholders have expressed concerns
with the Eagle Permit Rule and seeking public input on how the Service can clarify
the criteria for issuance of programmatic and standard Eagle ITPs. Specifically, the
Service sought public input on whether the Eagle Permit Rule should be revised to
make the ‘‘take that cannot practicably be avoided’’ criteria for issuance of a standard
applicable to programmatic Eagle ITPs as well, rather than the current criteria for
programmatic permits that the take be ‘‘unavoidable” and whether it should modify
its current interpretation of the Eagle Act’s preservation standard to mean
“consistent with the goal of stable or increasing breeding populations” for purposes
of issuing Eagle ITPs.).
111. The Service issued a Notice of Availability for public comments on the
Draft Eagle Guidance on February 18, 2011.
Migratory Birds; Draft Eagle
Conservation Plan Guidance, 76 Fed. Reg. 9,529 (proposed Feb. 18, 2011) (to be
codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 22). By the close of the comment period on May 19, 2011,
the Service received over 130 public comments. See Comments - Draft Eagle Conservation
Plan Guidance, U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERV. (OCT. 9, 2012), available at http://www.fws.gov
/windenergy/Guidance_Comments6.html.
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framework managed to make everyone unhappy. Perhaps recognizing this
and presumably wrestling with how the Draft Eagle Guidance could be
modified to address so many conflicting and often contradictory concerns
raised by public comments, more than 18 months passed from the close of
the public comment period on the Draft Eagle Guidance to the Service’s
issuance of the final Eagle Conservation Plan Guidance (the “Final Eagle
Guidance”) on April 26, 2013, a full year later than the issuance date of
Spring 2012 projected in the Draft Eagle Guidance.112
At over 100 pages, the Final Eagle Guidance provides detailed
recommended procedures “to promote compliance” with the BGEPA
generally and programmatic permits under the Eagle Permit Rule

112. EAGLE CONSERVATION PLAN GUIDANCE, supra note 41. An open question since
the development of the Eagle Permit Rule is whether a developer that obtains a take
permit under those rules receives any protection from prosecution under the MBTA
for the take of an eagle. The Draft Eagle Guidance suggested that no such protection
exists: “Because neither the MBTA nor its permit regulations . . . provide a specific
mechanism to permit ‘unintentional’ take, it is important for project proponents to
work proactively with the Service to avoid and minimize take of migratory birds.” In
other words, caveat emptor—obtaining a take permit under the BGEPA does not
insulate you from prosecution under the MBTA. This language remains in the Final
Eagle Guidance, but it is now preceded by a somewhat startling statement: “For
eagles, the BGEPA take authorization serves as authorization under MBTA per 50
C.F.R. 22.11(b). For other MBTA-protected birds, because neither the MBTA nor its
permit regulations . . . currently provide a specific mechanism to permit “incidental”
take, it is important for project proponents to work proactively with the Service to
avoid and minimize take of migratory birds.” Does this mean the Service is
guaranteeing a wind project developer immunity from MBTA prosecution for taking a
bald or golden eagle so long as it holds a valid incidental take permit under the
BGEPA’s Eagle Permit Rules? If so, does the Service even have the authority to make
such a guarantee where it is the Department of Justice, not the Service that makes
the ultimate decision on whether to bring a prosecution under the MBTA? 50 C.F.R.
22.11(b) provides that the holder of a BGEPA take permit does not need a permit
under the regulations implementing the MBTA for any activity permitted under the
MBTA with respect to bald or golden eagles. Sounds good, but recall that the
incidental take of a protected bird (which includes eagles) is not an activity
permitted under the MBTA. Thus, the Service’s sole source of authority for this
radical new conception of the extent of protection offered to the holder of an
incidental take permit appears to contradict rather than support it. At the time of
this writing, 2 months after the issuance of the Final Eagle Guidance, the author has
found no discussion or analysis of what this apparently new approach means for
MBTA liability for wind developers who take eagles pursuant to a BGEPA incidental
take permit.
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specifically.113 A wind developer seeking a programmatic Eagle ITP for the
unintentional take of eagles by its proposed project is encouraged but not
required to develop an Eagle Conservation Plan (ECP) that adheres to the
data collection and analysis processes set forth in the Final Eagle
Guidance.114 These processes fall into the following five stages that roughly
correspond to the stages of constructing and operating a wind farm and
must be addressed in the ECP: (1) collecting preconstruction information to
identify important eagle use areas to identify appropriate development sites;
(2) conducting surveys and assessments of the chosen site to quantify the
risk of the wind project to eagles; (3) using the data gathered in stage 2,
model the potential level of eagle fatalities and other forms of take from the
project during the tenure of the permit; (4) determine potential conservation
measures and advanced conservation practices to avoid or minimize these
potential impacts; and (5) developing a protocol to monitor the actual
impacts to eagles during construction and operation of the wind farm.115 It
is the ECP (or an alternate submittal should the developer decide not to
follow the guidelines) that the Service will evaluate in determining whether
to issue a programmatic Eagle ITP.
There are many changes from the Draft Eagle Guidance in the Final
Eagle Guidance; several of which strongly suggest that the Service was
compelled by the criticisms leveled against the Draft Eagle Guidance by the
American Wind Energy Association and other wind energy interest and trade
groups. Most notable for purposes of this article is the addition of language
to the guidance recommending a prenegotiated “cost cap” for any advanced
conservation practices (ACPs) required in the programmatic Eagle ITP to
provide “financial certainty” to the developer.116 Recall that under Section
22.26(a) of the Eagle Permit Rule a programmatic Eagle ITP may only be
issued if it can be shown that the proposed incidental take is “unavoidable”
even after implementation of ACPs. However, in the Eagle Permit Rule’s
more than three years of existence, the Service has yet to approve a single
ACP for wind energy projects because “there are currently no available
scientifically supportable measures that will reduce eagle disturbance and

113.

Id. at 4.

114. While the Service is at pains to emphasize that a wind developer seeking
a programmatic Eagle ITP that chooses an approach to demonstrating Eagle Permit
Rule compliance that deviates from the voluntary guidelines will not be denied the
permit on that basis alone, it suggests that the developer should coordinate closely
with the Service on this alternative approach and will be likely to experience longer
application processing times. See id. at 5.
115.

Id.

116.

Id. at 10.
31

West

Northwest, Vol. 20, No. 1, Winter 2014

blade-strike mortality at wind projects.”117 Without an approved ACP to use
in testing whether a proposed incidental take is in fact unavoidable after its
implementation, the Service would appear to be powerless to issue a
programmatic permit that meets 22.26(a)’s requirements. The Final Eagle
Guidance’s creative solution to this problem is to suggest the development
of “experimental ACPs” as part of the programmatic take permit process.118
The Final Eagle Guidance suggests that during the permitting process the
Service and permit applicant should discuss and identify any experimental
ACPs that might reduce or eliminate risks to eagles from the proposed wind
farm. Unless there is “reasonable scientific basis” to implement an
identified experimental ACP upon issuance of the permit, it’s
implementation will be deferred until there is an actual eagle take by the
wind farm or the Service determines its implementation is warranted by a
heightened risk of eagle take by the wind farm’s facilities.119 The developer’s
agreement to this scheme of deferred implementation is a condition to
receiving the programmatic Eagle ITP.
The Service envisions negotiating the cost cap for implementing these
experimental ACPs prior to issuance of the permit, and suggests the cap
amount should be “relevant to the theorized risk factors identified for the
project, and proportional to overall risk.”120 That rather opaque language,
which is the extent of the Final Eagle Guideline’s discussion of the cost cap,
is illustrative of Final Eagle Guidance’s encouraging but ultimately
unsuccessful attempt to address the cost uncertainty barrier to increasing
programmatic Eagle ITP applications. Rather than basing the cost cap
calculation on something tangible and presumably knowable, such as a joint
determination of the expected costs of implementing the specific mitigation
measures that make up the ACP, the Service opts for a far “squishier”
standard focused exclusively on undefined risk factors. This standard is
troubling on two fronts. First because it suggests the Service lacks
confidence that it can create an experimental ACP with specific, scientifically
supported mitigation requirements to support an activity and hard costbased cap. If that’s the case, the financial certainty offered by the cost cap
offers cold comfort to the wind developer, who must agree upfront to an
experimental ACP with uncertain requirements. And second, even if the
mitigation measures that make up the experimental ACP are amenable to

117.

Id. See also 50 C.F.R. § 22.3.

118. EAGLE CONSERVATION PLAN GUIDANCE, supra note 41, at 10. These ACPs
would be experimental because at the time of permitting they would not meet C.F.R.
§ 22.3 definition of ACPs as ‘‘scientifically supportable measures that are approved
by the Service and represent the best available techniques to reduce eagle
disturbance and ongoing mortalities to a level where remaining take is unavoidable.’’
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such a calculation, the Service could nevertheless find justification in the
proposed risk-based standard for a cost cap far in excess of the actual ACP
implementation costs based on a conception of the yet-to-be built project’s
risks to eagles that is at odds (perhaps radically so) with the developer’s.
While the idea of a cost cap is appealing in its potential to offer cost
certainty, that appeal disappears without a corresponding assurance that
the amount of the cap will be rationally related to actual cost of
implementing the experimental ACP.
Further undermining the alleged cost certainty offered to developers
by the proposed cost cap is the fact that it does not appear to be applicable
to any compensatory mitigation measures required of the developer. The
Final Eagle Guidance restates the Eagle Permit Rule’s requirement that a
programmatic Eagle ITP may only be issued if the proposed take is
compatible with the BGEPA’s underlying goal, as interpreted by the Service,
of increasing or stabilizing eagle breeding populations. To meet this
requirement, the project ECP should show that the level of eagle take from
the wind farm predicted in the ECP is within the applicable regional eagle
take threshold set out in the Eagle Permit Rule’s FEO. However, even if the
predicted take exceeds the applicable regional eagle take threshold, the
permit may be issued if compensatory mitigation measures the developer
commits to perform (by reducing another ongoing form of eagle mortality
(e.g., electrocution by power lines) and/or causing an increase in carrying
capacity) will bring the predicted take within the threshold. While the
Service suggests that any compensatory mitigation measures should be
specified in the permit to provide the developer to account for the cost of
such measures in evaluating project economics, it warns that a failure to
properly estimate eagle takes from the project (identified in post-permit
issuance project monitoring in the ECP) may result in requiring the
developer to undertake post-operation compensatory mitigation measures
no anticipated in the permit that will pose “hardships” for the developer.121
The scale and scope of these hardships will be determined through the Final
Eagle Guideline’s recommended adaptive management framework, which
“consists of case-specific considerations applied within a national
framework” and that may include “operational adjustments at individual
projects at regular intervals where deemed necessary and appropriate.”122
The Final Eagle Guidance, which was developed in response to “the
urgent need for guidance on permitting eagle take at wind facilities”123 tries
but fails to provide a workable solution to balancing the wind
developer/investor Holy Grail of permitting and cost certainty with bird
advocates’ insistence that the promise of eagle protection made by the

121.

Id. at 11.

122.

Id. at 9.

123.

DRAFT EAGLE CONSERVATION PLAN GUIDANCE, supra note 1, at 8.
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BGEPA be supported by a strong and thoughtful permitting regime, because
it ultimately fails to adequately address the fundamental issues of permit
insecurity and cost uncertainty that have caused the underutilization of
programmatic Eagle ITPs and stymied the development of wind energy
projects in eagle habitat. The continuation of this state of affairs is likely
welcomed by some who believe that wind energy and eagles are inherently
incompatible and that the death of even one eagle is too steep a price to
pay for the environmental benefits offered by wind energy. While it’s not
hard to sympathize with this hardline stance, especially when faced with the
horrible damage wind turbines inflict on these magnificent animals,124 the
present and future environmental catastrophe that is global warming and
the dearth of currently available economically and politically viable clean
energy alternatives to wind energy with the potential to reduce our
dependence on the greenhouse gas emitting fossil-based energy sources
that are a primary cause of global warming demands a more accommodating
approach.
This is not to say that transitioning from coal, oil and gas to wind is
the single solution to climate change. Wind energy must pass over many
hurdles before it has a realistic chance of displacing fossil fuels as the
primary source of electrical generation in the U.S., including its intermittent
nature (the wind does not blow all of the time) which makes it ill-suited to
providing the baseload power required by utilities and regulators, an
economic handicap imposed by a major imbalance in the federal subsidies
wind energy receives as compared to fossil fuels,125 and significant
opposition to expanded wind energy based on aesthetics, noise and other
nuisance-based complaints. And even if and when those hurdles are
overcome, wind energy would be just one resource in a suite of zero or low

124. For a graphic description of this damage, see Cappiello, supra note 2. (“The
rehabilitation coordinator for the Rocky Mountain Raptor Program, Michael Tincher,
said he euthanized two golden eagles found starving and near death near wind
farms. Both had injuries he’d never seen before: One of their wings appeared to be
twisted off.”).
125. A study by the Environmental Law Institute found that during the period
of 2002-2008 federal subsidies for fossil fuels outpaced subsidies for renewable
energy (wind, solar, biomass, etc.) by almost three-to-one ($72.5 billion to $29
billion). See ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE, ESTIMATING U.S. GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES TO
ENERGY SOURCES: 2002-2008 (2009), available at http://www.elistore.org/Data/products/
d19_07.pdf. What’s more, most of the federal subsidies for fossil fuels are written in
the Internal Revenue Code as permanent provisions that can be counted on in
calculating project economics, while most renewable energy subsidies, such as the
Production Tax Credit in I.R.C. § 45 (2006), are implemented through temporary
enactments with short timeframes (often 2 years or less) that create uncertainty for
project economics and depress investment interest.
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emission energy sources necessary to fulfill our country’s energy needs.126
Nor is it meant to suggest that the immediacy of the environmental
catastrophe that is global warming justifies wantonly sacrificing the survival
of any animal that gets in the way of green energy. The same deep humanist
concern than animates our profound concern for the future survival of the
human animal on a hot planet should inform our efforts to find solutions to
this threat, particularly those solutions that threaten the survival of nonhuman animals.
All of that said, however, there is likely no greater threat to the longterm survival of all animal species than climate change,127 a fact that even
many environmental groups who decry the injury done to animals by wind
energy development recognize.128 This dire threat demands solutions that
recognize humankind’s obligation to protect and preserve threatened and
endangered animal species while also making rational allowances for the
continued responsible production of the electricity upon which our society
relies. While by no means a complete solution , for the dual goals of
protecting eagles and growing wind energy, there are two changes the
Service can make to the Eagle Permit Rule and Final Eagle Guidance. These
changes will increase the utilization of programmatic Eagle ITPs and
continue the growth of wind energy in eagle habitat without unduly
weakening the protections currently afforded eagles under the BGEPA. The
first change is to increase the term of a programmatic Eagle ITP from five
years to thirty years to match the typical life of a wind energy project, as
proposed by the Service and discussed above.129 The second is to build on
the cost cap concept, described in the Final Eagle Guidance, by offering

126. In 2012, 12% of the electricity generated in the U.S. was generated from
renewable resources, with 28% of that amount coming from wind energy and the rest
from hydro (56%), biomass (12%), geothermal (3%), and solar (1%). See Energy In Brief,
How much of our electricity is generated from renewable energy?, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (May
7, 2013), available at http://www.eia.gov/energy_in_brief/article/renewable_electricity.cfm.
127. See e.g., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE
2007: SYNTHESIS REPORT 13-14, available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/
ar4/syr/ar4_syr_spm.pdf (Predicting that among the likely irreversible impacts from
climate change are extinctions of 40% to 70% of species assessed if the global
average temperature increase exceeds about 3.5° Celsius).
See NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION, SHIFTING SKIES: MIGRATORY BIRDS IN A
WARMING WORLD (2013), available at https://www.nwf.org/pdf/Reports/NWF_Migratory_
Birds_Report_web_Final.pdf (recognizing the hazards posed to birds by renewable
energy but nevertheless describing climate change as the biggest threat facing birds
and advocating for a responsible and rapid transition to renewable energy sources
such as wind energy).
128.

129. Eagle Permits; Changes in the Regulations Governing Eagle Permitting,
77 Fed. Reg. 22267 (proposed Apr. 13, 2012) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pts. 13, 22).
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more tangible assurances to a programmatic Eagle ITP permittee (and by
extension its investors). These assurances would provide that unforeseen
eagle-related circumstances during the life of the project will not increase
the permittee’s compliance obligations and costs. While these changes
alter the Eagle Permit Rule’s current incidental take regime, they are neither
radical nor unprecedented, and making them would actually be a positive
step by the Service in the direction of regulatory consistency by bringing the
Eagle Permit Rule’s incidental take permitting requirements more in line
with those of that “other” species protection act many wind developers must
contend with—the Endangered Species Act.130

IV. Intentional Harmonization of Incidental Takes
There is almost no end to the factors a wind developer must consider
when evaluating the suitability of a site for a wind farm. At the top of the list
of course is the site’s wind resource, but not far behind are access to
transmission lines, interconnection possibilities, ease of construction,
landowner interest in leasing property, local land use rules, potential NIMBY
issues, and on and on. There are also the all important considerations of
what animals live on and above the site, how and to what degree those
animals be impacted by the wind farm, and assuming there are impacts,
what laws govern whether and to what extent those impacts are permissible.

A. A Parable
Imagine two fictional wind developers that in the grand tradition of
uninspired law professor naming conventions (Blackacre? Greenacre? Ugh.)
we’ll call Developer A and Developer B. Each developer is searching high
and low for a suitable site upon which to build its next wind farm and each
stumbles across a site that appears to have it all. While these sites are in
different parts on the U.S., they are both genuine wind energy nirvanas with
strong and steady winds, transmission lines galore, a willing landowner, and
strong local support for wind energy. After securing the necessary land
rights for its site, each developer gets busy with its site studies, including a
site assessment to determine what critters that live on or use the site. A few
weeks later Developer A receives a completed site assessment from its
overpriced but thorough consultant that highlights only one species of
concern on the site: black-footed ferrets, a listed endangered species under
the ESA.131 The next day Developer B receives its site assessment from its
overpriced but thorough consultant that also highlights only one species of

130.

Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531 – 1544 (2006).

131. The black-footed ferret was first listed under the ESA on January 4, 1974. See
Black-Footed Ferret Draft Recovery Plan, 78 Fed. Reg. 23,948 (published Apr. 23, 2013).
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concern on the site: golden eagles, a protected species under the BGEPA.
Concerned, both developers ask their overpriced but thorough consultant do
some impact modeling. The modeling for Developer A’s site shows that two
black-footed ferrets will likely be killed as an incidental result of the
construction and operation of the wind farm on the site. The modeling for
Developer B’s site shows that two golden eagles will likely be killed as an
incidental result of the construction and operation of the wind farm on the
site.
Undeterred by this news, Developer A and Developer B each decide to
commit the significant time, resources and money to seek an incidental take
permit under the relevant law. Now imagine that both developers are
successful in this quest. What do they each have? Developer A has an
incidental take permit under the ESA that lasts for the duration of the
project and provides meaningful assurances that as long as Developer A is
in compliance with the permit it will not bear the expense of responding to
impacts on black-footed ferrets on the site resulting from unforeseen
circumstances. Developer B has a programmatic Eagle ITP that lasts for only
the first 5 years of the project with no automatic renewal and a very real
possibility of incurring substantial additional mitigation costs even during
this attenuated term.
What is the rationale for this difference? It can’t be based on different
approval standards and processes for the permits. The standards and
processes for obtaining a Programmatic Eagle ITP are if anything more
arduous than those for obtaining an ESA incidental take permit. It can’t be
related some extralegal conception of the intrinsic value of the animal at
issue. Our species protection laws do not countenance such distinctions,
and even if they did, it would be a strange result indeed to offer better
protection to the non-listed species than to the listed endangered species.132
It can’t be . . . well . . . it can’t be anything really; yet it is. To understand why
this difference exists and, more important, why it should be done away with,
it’s helpful to trace the evolution of incidental take permits under the ESA.

B. ESA Incidental Take Permits
In passing the ESA in 1973, Congress recognized the “esthetic,
ecological, educational, historical, recreational, and scientific value” of
endangered and threatened fish, wildlife and plants to the United States and

132. The golden eagle has never been listed as an endangered or threatened
species under the ESA. Until its delisting on August 9, 2007, the bald eagle spent
almost 30 years as a listed endangered or threatened species under the ESA. See
Removing the Bald Eagle in the Lower 48 States from the List of Endangered and
Threatened Wildlife, 72 Fed. Reg. 37,346 (July 9, 2007) (to be codified in 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
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its citizens.133 Giving voice to the animating concern behind the law, it found
that various species of fish, wildlife, and plants in the United States had
been rendered extinct or were in danger of being rendered extinct “as a
consequence of economic growth and development untempered by
adequate concern and conservation.”134 Congress’s answer to the problem of
species extinction can be seen in the expressed purpose for the ESA: to
protect and recover threatened and endangered species and the ecosystems
upon which they depend.135
Co-administered by the Service (with responsibility for terrestrial
species and freshwater fish) and the National Marine Fisheries Service
(NMFS) (with responsibility for marine species and anadromous fish), the
ESA utilizes a listing mechanism in Section 4 to bring threatened and
endangered species within the protections of the Act.136 A species may be
listed as either endangered or threatened. An endangered species is “in
danger of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its range.”137 A
threatened species is “likely to become an endangered species within the
foreseeable future.”138
Once a species has been listed, the full panoply of ESA protections are
brought to bear to reverse its decline and hasten its recovery, including
designating critical habitat for the species139 and developing recovery

133.

16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(3).

134.

Id. § 1531(a)(1) - (2).

135. Id. § 1531(b). As many commentators have noted, while the ESA’s stated
purpose to protect both imperiled species and the ecosystem upon which they rely,
the Act’s failure to define the term “ecosystems” and its lack of any ecosystem
protection requirements has resulted in the ESA’s primary use being the
preservation of individual species and, more narrowly, the critical habitat they
occupy, rather than broader shared ecosystems. See. e.g., Douglas P. Wheeler & Ryan
M. Rowberry, Habitat Conservation Plans and the Endangered Species Act, in ENDANGERED
SPECIES ACT 220 (Donald C. Baur, William Robert Irvin, eds., 2010); LYNN SCARLETT,
RESHAPING THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: A HOLISTIC APPROACH NEEDED? (Resources for
the Future 2010), available at http://www.rff.org/rff/documents/rff-ib-10-15.pdf.
136. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1). All species of plants and animals, except pest
insects, are eligible for listing as endangered or threatened under the ESA, “Species”
is defined by Congress to include subspecies, varieties, and, for vertebrates, distinct
population segments. For an excellent discussion of the listing process, see Kalyani
Robbins, Strength in Number: Setting Quantitative Criteria for Listing Species Under the
Endangered Species Act, 27 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1, 7 (2009).
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16 U.S.C. § 1532(6).

138.

Id. § 1532(20).

139.

Id. § 1533(a)(3).
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plans.140 Section 7 of the ESA imposes a requirement on all federal agencies
to consult with the responsible agency (either the Service or NMFS) to
insure that any action authorized, funded or carried out by the agency is “not
likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or
threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse modification of
[critical] habitat of such species.”141
Section 9 prohibits any person (private or public) from taking a listed
species.142 Similar to the take definition under the BGEPA, a “take” occurs
under the ESA when a listed species is harassed, harmed, pursued, hunted,
shot, killed, wounded, trapped, captured or collected, or by any attempt to
engage in such conduct.143 The word “harm” in Section 9’s take standard was
defined by the Secretary of Interior to include the injury or death of a listed
species from “significant habitat modification or degradation” that impairs
essential behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding or sheltering,
which significantly expanded the number of development activities requiring
some habitat modification that could potentially be enjoined by the ESA.144
In the absence of a valid exception (e.g., immunity from prosecution or
holding a permit allowing the take), an entity that violates Section 9 by
taking an endangered or threatened species faces potential monetary
liability and imprisonment through federal enforcement or citizen suit.145
This expansive take definition, coupled with several significant cases
decided during the late 1970s and early 1980s constraining large
development projects based on a strict reading of the ESA’s take
prohibitions,146 caused the financial and development communities to
question the wisdom of investing the time, money and resources into a
project that could be stopped at any time because of the presence of a listed
species. In the large, capital-intensive project development world, financial
investors demand a high degree of confidence in the return on their

140.

Id. § 1533(f).

141.

Id. § 1536(a)(2).

142.

Id. § 1538(a)(1).

143.

Id. § 1532(19).

144. Final Redefinition of “Harm,” 46 Fed. Reg. 54748, 54750 (Nov. 4, 1981)
(codified in 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
145. See 16 U.S.C. § 1540(a)-(f) (providing for monetary penalties, imprisonment,
and property forfeiture for illegal takes of listed species).
146. See, e.g., Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) (enjoining the TVA’s
construction of a dam that would eradicate the snail darter, a three-inch fish that was
listed as endangered under the ESA); Palila v. Haw. Dep’t of Land & Natural Res., 471
F. Supp. 985 (D. Haw. 1979), aff’d, 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981) (affirming the district
court’s ruling that harm caused by habitat modification from maintaining feral goats
and sheep in the critical habitat of the endangered palila bird was a take under the ESA).
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investment before they will commit funds. Simply put, investors are loathe
to invest when their expected return on that investment is at risk because of
factors that are hard to predict and quantify. The discovery of a listed
species at a project site that can trigger ESA protections, up to and
including stopping project operations that might take the species,
particularly where the discovery is made at an operational project after
investments have been made, presents just such an unacceptable
investment risk and can stifle investment and development. This describes
the environment in 1982 when Congress stepped in to amend the ESA to
authorize the issuance of incidental take permits to private (non-federal)
landowners under a revised Section 10(a) of the Act.147 An incidental take is
a take that is “incidental to, and not the purpose of, the carrying out of an
otherwise lawful activity.”148 This amendment represented a sea change in
the ESA world. No longer was the take of a listed species a per se violation
of the Act. Rather, a nonfederal project developer (and, importantly, its
investors) was given an avenue for development of a project that might
result in the incidental take a listed species but nevertheless would not run
afoul of the Act.149
An innovative conservation plan developed in 1982 between
developers, citizen groups and the local government for the development of
San Bruno Mountain in northern California is often credited for spurring the
1982 ESA amendment allowing for incidental take permits under the ESA.
San Bruno Mountain was critical habitat for the Mission Blue butterfly, a
listed endangered species. The coalition of developers, citizen groups and
local government were well aware that any development of San Bruno
Mountain was almost certain to violate Section 9 of the Act by taking
Mission Blue butterflies, through injury or death resulting from habitat
modification and more direct impacts. Undeterred, a steering committee
was formed and it commissioned a biological study of the mountain that
showed that even in the absence of development on the mountain, the
butterflies’ host plants on the mountain would be destroyed due to naturally
encroaching exotic species and brush, such as eucalyptus and grose.150

147. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a). Prior to the 1982 amendments, Section 10 allowed
issuance of take permits to non-federal entities for very limited purposes, including
scientific permits, hardship exemptions, and the release of experimental
populations.
148.

Id. § 1539(a)(1)(B).

149. Section 7 of the ESA provides authority for the issuance of incidental take
permits to federal entities. Id. § 1536.
150. See SAN BRUNO MOUNTAIN COOPERATIVE SITE, SAN BRUNO MOUNTAIN HCP
DOCUMENTS Volume 1, Summary at S-1 (Nov. 8, 1982), available at http://www.traenviro.
com/sanbruno/hcp/vol_1_summary.pdf.
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In light of this study, the steering committee developed the San Bruno
Mountain Area Habitat Conservation Plan, which required the project
developers to undertake mitigation measures such as developers dedicating
privately owned lots on the mountain to “conserved habitat” to compensate
for the estimated destruction of 14% of the butterflies’ habitat (and resultant
ESA-prohibited takes) from the proposed development.151 By comparing the
expected destruction of Mission Blue’s habitat from encroaching brush and
exotic species in the absence of any development of the mountain with the
preservation of 86% of the butterflies’ habitat expected from the mitigation
measures required of the planned development, the Habitat Conservation
Plan concluded that it was the latter path that better protected the listed
species.152 Emboldened by this conclusion, the San Bruno constituents
lobbied Congress for an exemption from the Act’s take prohibitions.
In amending Section 10(a) to allow for the issuance of incidental take
permits, Congress also adopted the San Bruno model by requiring the
development of a habitat conservation plan designed to further the longterm conservation of the species at issue and to avoid jeopardy to the
continued existence of the species as part of the application for an
incidental take permit.153 Similar to the ECP described in the Final Eagle
Guidance, the habitat conservation plan specifies the impact which will
likely result from such taking; the steps the applicant will take to minimize
and mitigate such impacts, including funding sources; and the alternative
actions to the requested taking the applicant considered and why any such
alternatives are not being utilized.154
When it took a file to the sharp teeth of the ESA by providing for
incidental take permits, Congress clearly intended to encourage investment
in and development of commercial projects on lands occupied by listed
species. Indeed, Congress indicated it was acting to ‘‘address[] the concerns
of private landowners who are faced with having otherwise lawful actions
not requiring Federal permits prevented by section 9 prohibitions against
taking.”155 Rather than the binary take or no take standard of Section 9,
Section 10’s incidental take permits and associated habitat conservation

151. See id. at V-4, available at http://www.traenviro.com/sanbruno/hcp/vol_1_
institutional_program.pdf.
152. See id. at IV-5, available at http://www.traenviro.com/sanbruno/hcp/vol_1_
imp_on_species.pdf.
153. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2). In fact, Congress made the San Bruno HCP its
model habitat conservation plan in drafting the amendments, even going so far as to
adopt several of its elements into the 1982 amendments. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 97835 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2860.
154.

16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2).

155.

H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 97-835 at 29 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2860, 2870.
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plans invited private development of lands even where a listed species
might suffer injury as an incidental result of such development. An
important component of this invitation was ensuring the duration of an ESA
incidental take permit was coincident with the life of the proposed
development.156 Unlike a programmatic Eagle ITP under the Eagle Permit
Rules that must be renewed every five years during the several decade life of
the wind farm, an ESA incidental take is usually granted for the life of the
project. This life-of-project permit duration resulted from Congress’s
expressed intent in passing the 1982 ESA amendments to encourage private
development within the strictures of the ESA:
[S]ignificant development projects often take many years to
complete and permit applicants may need long-term permits. In
this situation, and in order to provide sufficient incentives for the
private sector to participate in the development of such longterm conservation plans, plans which may involve the
expenditure of hundreds of thousands if not millions of dollars,
adequate assurances must be made to the financial and
development communities that a[n incidental take] permit can
be made available for the life of the project.157
Proponents of the 1982 ESA amendments clearly expected the creation
of a life-of-project incidental take permit would result in a flood of incidental
take permit applications from project developers who finally had a way
around the ESA’s strict take prohibitions, but that flood turned out to be a
trickle. Presaging the “tree falling in a forest” developer nonresponse to the
Eagle Permit Rule’s creation of programmatic Eagle ITPs more than two
decades later, there was no boom in ESA incidental take permit applications
during the remainder of the 1980s and into the early 1990s.158 What was
behind this indifference? In their article on habitat conservation plans
under the ESA, Douglas P. Wheeler and Ryan M. Rowberry suggest an
answer:

156. 50 C.F.R. § 17.32(b)(4) (2012) specifies the duration of incidental take
permits: “The duration of permits issued under this paragraph shall be sufficient to
provide adequate assurances to the permittee to commit funding necessary for the
activities authorized by the permit, including conservation activities and land use
restrictions.”
157. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 97-835 at 31 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2860, 2872.
158. Only 14 incidental take permits were issued under Section 10 in the
period from 1982 to 1992. Wheeler & Rowberry, supra note 135, at 224.
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Unfamiliarity with the process for applying for an ITP, along with
the time and cost associated with completion of the requisite
biological surveys undoubtedly contributed to this sluggish start.
But the overwhelming deterrent to greater use of HCPs remained
the looming specter of continuing liability for species not
covered by the Plan, and for unanticipated injury to habitat.159
In other words, while the existence of a pathway to up-front project
ESA liability certainty under Section 10’s incidental takes permit regime
offered some reassurance to nervous developers and investors, it was at best
an incomplete and shaky reassurance because it did nothing to ameliorate
the biggest unknown—what happens if, post-project operation, a nonpermitted impact on a listed species covered by the permit is discovered?
Must the project be taken off-line while the parties figure out how to deal
with this new impact? How long will that take? And, most important from
an investor’s point of view, how does one model the impact of return on
investment from an eventuality that is neither certain nor easily
quantifiable?
Project developers and investors voted with their feet and made little
use of incidental take permits. While it is no doubt the case that rather than
failing to build projects that threatened listed species during this period,
some developers opted instead to play ESA roulette by building
unpermitted projects and hoping for the best, it is likely that many projects
that would otherwise have been built, with all attendant economic benefits
to local communities and the overall economy, withered on the vine for lack
of capital. Something had to change to make the twin goals of species
protection and economic development of the 1982 amendments a reality.
That something (or, rather, someone) arrived in the person of Secretary of
the Interior Bruce Babbitt. Appointed by President Clinton and confirmed
by the Senate in 1993, Secretary Babbitt breached the dam holding back ESA
incidental take permit applications through a series of regulatory reforms
aimed at making the endangered species act friendlier to private sector
development and investment while maintaining its core mission of
protecting and restoring listed species.
Secretary Babbitt focused
particularly on unsticking the incidental take permit application process.
The lubricant Babbitt selected for the job was the “No Surprises” rule.160

159.

Id. at 223-24.

160. Secretary Babbitt did not invent this rule out of whole cloth. In fact,
Congress recognized the need for assurances of economic and regulatory certainty to
encourage private development of lands containing listed species in its deliberations
over the 1982 amendments to the ESA: “The Committee intends that the Secretary
may utilize [Section 10(b)] to approve conservation plans which provide long-term
commitments regarding the conservation of listed as well as unlisted species and
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C. “No Surprises” Rule
First proposed in 1994161 and issued as a final rule in 1998,162 the “No
Surprises” rule requires the agency (either the Service or NMFS) approving
an incidental take permit and related habitat conservation plan under
Section 10(b)(2) to provide the nonfederal applicant with assurances that
the government “will honor its agreements under a negotiated and approved
HCP for which the permittee is in good faith implementing the HCP’s terms
and conditions.”163 Specifically, the “No Surprises” rule provides that even if
“unforeseen circumstances”164 with regard to a listed species covered by the
habitat conservation plan arise after approval of the plan, the incidental take
permit holder will not be required to commit “additional land, water or
financial compensation or additional restrictions on the use of land, water,
or other natural resources” to respond to the impact of these unforeseen
circumstances on the covered species.165 In other words, as long as the
incidental take permittee is in compliance with the approved habitat
conservation plan, it will not be required to expend additional resources or
commit to further restrictions on its use of the land beyond the level
required in the HCP because of unforeseen circumstances impacting a
covered species, even if such additional expenditures or restrictions would
long-term assurances to the proponent of the conservation plan that the terms of the
plan will be adhered to and that further mitigation requirements will only be
imposed in accordance with the terms of the plan. In the event that an unlisted
species addressed in the approved conservation plan is subsequently listed pursuant
to the Act, no further mitigation requirements should be imposed if the conservation
plan addressed the conservation of the species and its habitat as if the species were
listed pursuant to the Act.” See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 97-835 at 30 (1982), reprinted in
1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2860, 2871. The No Surprises Policy cited and relied upon the
same statement of the Congressional intent. See Habitat Conservation Plan
Assurances (“No Surprises”) Rule, 63 Fed Reg. 8859, 8860 (Feb. 23, 1998) (codified in
50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
161.
at 8859.
162.

Habitat Conservation Plan Assurances (“No Surprises”) Rule, 63 Fed. Reg.
Id.

163. No Surprises Policy, 62 Fed. Reg. 29091, 29093 (proposed May 29, 1997)
(to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 222).
164. “Unforeseen circumstances” means “changes in circumstances affecting a
species or geographic area covered by an HCP that could not reasonably have been
anticipated by the by plan developers or the Services at the time of the HCP’s
negotiation and development, and that result in a substantial and adverse change in
the status of a covered species.” Habitat Conservation Plan Assurances (“No
Surprises”) Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. at 8868.
165.
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otherwise be appropriate under the ESA to conserve the covered species.
The cost of any additional mitigation measures to respond to such
unforeseen circumstances is borne by the federal government, not the
permittee.166
The extent to which the “No Surprises” rule met its stated objective to
“provide economic and regulatory certainty”167 for nonfederal incidental take
permittees can be seen by the huge increase in the number of incidental
take permits and related habitat conservation plans approved in the years
following its finalization.168 Here at last was the risk reduction long sought
by private developers and investors. By diminishing the specter of postoperational ESA take liability and offering a heightened degree of cost
certainty, the incidental take permit amendments, habitat conservation
plans, and the “No Surprises” rule combined to open the door to private
investment in projects with incidental impacts on ESA-listed species.
Whereas before these projects might have struggled to attract investors
because of Section 9’s harsh take prohibitions, this suite of reforms made
them a viable investment target. In so doing, the twin goals of the 1982 ESA
amendments of encouraging and accommodating development while
preserving and bolstering listed species and their habitats were met. Once
again developers and investors voted with their feet, but this time it was to
walk toward, rather than away from, private development projects with ESA
implications.

D. Finishing the Job
The BGEPA, like the ESA, is first and foremost a species preservation
and recovery law. As originally drafted both laws took a strict approach to
achieve their preservation and recovery goals by outlawing all takings of
covered species.
This inflexibility stifled desirable and necessary
development without offering a clear benefit to species preservation and
recovery, so both laws were changed to allow for incidental takings of
covered species in limited circumstances. In both instances, these changes
did not have the desired effect of providing a pathway to responsible
development that would be utilized by developers. For the ESA, this was
fixed through a life-of-project permit duration and the introduction of “no
surprises” assurances that gave developers the regulatory certainty they
needed to move forward under the ESA’s incidental take permit regime.

166.
167.
at 8867.

Id. § 17.32(b)(5).
Habitat Conservation Plan Assurances (“No Surprises”) Rule, 63 Fed. Reg.

168. Compare the 14 incidental take permits were issued under Section 10 in
the period from 1982 to 1992 to the 601 incidental take permits issued in the period
from 1993 to 2009. See Wheeler & Rowberry, supra note 135, at 224-25.
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The question of whether the ESA has been an overall success is the
subject of no small debate that is beyond the scope of this article, but it’s
hard to argue with the ESA’s remarkable track record of promoting the
recovery of listed species. A 2012 report by the Center for Biological
Diversity compared the actual recovery rate of 110 ESA listed species with
the recovery rates projected in their federal recovery plans and found that
90% of the species are recovering at the rate called for by their federal
recovery plans.169 There is no evidence that the issuance of life-of-project
incidental take permits with “no surprises” assurances to developers over
the last 20 years has impeded this species recovery in any meaningful way.
In fact, the opposite is likely true, as the development and implementation
of the HCP required to obtain an ESA incidental take permit has the salutary
effect of focusing the permittee on critical aspects of species protection and
recovery (and obtaining its tangible and measurable commitment to adhere
to them) before the first shovel of dirt has been turned on the project. In
this way, the ESA has managed to meet its ultimate goal of species
protection and recovery while allowing the incidental take of species under
life-of-project permits with no surprises assurances. One can easily imagine
a similar result should the Eagle Permit Rule track this same path toward
balancing conservation with environmentally responsible development. It is
a result we should welcome.

V. Conclusion
Wind turbines kill birds. A lot of birds. You would be hard pressed to
find someone who is happy with that fact, including anyone in the wind
energy development community.
But until and unless there are
technological advances in wind turbine design that eliminate their deadly
impact on birds, it is something we must accept. Of course, acceptance
does not and should not mean issuing a blank check to wind energy
developers to wantonly injure birds. To do so would violate both the spirit
and letter of a host of environmental laws that have at their core a stubborn
insistence that human demands on the environment must be balanced
against duties of stewardship owed to all animals. Among these laws is the
BGEPA, which makes manifest our commitment to preserving bald and
golden eagles. It does no damage to this commitment to recognize that it
must be balanced other environmental imperatives, including and especially
an imperative of the scope and seriousness of global warming. The Service’s
creation of programmatic incidental eagle take permits in the Eagle Permit
Rule was a clear but thus far unsuccessful effort to strike this balance by
allowing for the responsible development of wind energy projects in eagle
169. See KIERAN SUCKLING ET AL., ON TIME, ON TARGET: HOW THE ENDANGERED
SPECIES ACT IS SAVING AMERICA’S WILDLIFE (Center for Biological Diversity 2012), available
at http://www.esasuccess.org/pdfs/110_REPORT.pdf.
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habitat. By adopting the targeted changes to the Eagle Permit Rule
suggested in this article, however, balance is still possible.
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* * *
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